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020 _a9780674059900
_qprint
020 _a9780674065338
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024 7 _a10.4159/harvard.9780674065338
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780674065338
035 _a(DE-B1597)178200
035 _a(OCoLC)794003569
035 _a(OCoLC)840445630
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aBD530
072 7 _aPHI013000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a122
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aMarcus, Eric
_eautore
245 1 0 _aRational Causation /
_cEric Marcus.
264 1 _aCambridge, MA :
_bHarvard University Press,
_c[2012]
264 4 _c©2012
300 _a1 online resource :
_b1 table
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _t Frontmatter --
_tContents --
_tIntroduction --
_t1. Rational Explanation of Belief --
_t2. Rational Explanation of Action --
_t3. (Non-Human) Animals and Their Reasons --
_t4. Rational Explanation and Rational Causation --
_t5. Events and States --
_t6. Physicalism --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aWe explain what people think and do by citing their reasons, but how do such explanations work, and what do they tell us about the nature of reality? Contemporary efforts to address these questions are often motivated by the worry that our ordinary conception of rationality contains a kernel of supernaturalism-a ghostly presence that meditates on sensory messages and orchestrates behavior on the basis of its ethereal calculations. In shunning this otherworldly conception, contemporary philosophers have focused on the project of "naturalizing" the mind, viewing it as a kind of machine that converts sensory input and bodily impulse into thought and action. Eric Marcus rejects this choice between physicalism and supernaturalism as false and defends a third way. He argues that philosophers have failed to take seriously the idea that rational explanations postulate a distinctive sort of causation-rational causation. Rational explanations do not reveal the same sorts of causal connections that explanations in the natural sciences do. Rather, rational causation draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings. Marcus defends this position against a wide array of physicalist arguments that have captivated philosophers of mind for decades. Along the way he provides novel views on, for example, the difference between rational and nonrational animals and the distinction between states and events.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 08. Jul 2019)
650 0 _aAct (Philosophy)
650 0 _aAgent (Philosophy)
650 0 _aCausation.
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / Metaphysics.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674065338
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780674065338.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c190325
_d190325