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019 _a(OCoLC)840437326
020 _a9780674049895
_qprint
020 _a9780674067325
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.4159/harvard.9780674067325
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780674067325
035 _a(DE-B1597)178053
035 _a(OCoLC)819330020
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aKF5130
_b.E67 2013eb
072 7 _aLAW111000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a347.7314
_221
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aEpstein, Lee
_eautore
245 1 4 _aThe Behavior of Federal Judges :
_bA Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice /
_cLee Epstein, William M Landes, Richard A Posner.
264 1 _aCambridge, MA :
_bHarvard University Press,
_c[2013]
264 4 _c©2012
300 _a1 online resource (446 p.) :
_b20 graphs, 100 tables
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tList of Figures --
_tList of Tables --
_tGeneral Introduction --
_tTechnical Introduction --
_t1. A Realistic Theory of Judicial Behavior --
_t2. The Previous Empirical Literature --
_t3. The Supreme Court --
_t4. The Courts of Appeals --
_t5. The District Courts and the Selection Effect --
_t6. Dissents and Dissent Aversion --
_t7. The Questioning of Lawyers at Oral Argument --
_t8. The Auditioners --
_tConclusion: The Way Forward --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _a
520 _aJudges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision makers is not well understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made. The authors derive their hypotheses from a labor-market model, which allows them to consider judges as they would any other economic actors: as self-interested individuals motivated by both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of their work. In their view, this model describes judicial behavior better than either the traditional "legalist" theory, which sees judges as automatons who mechanically apply the law to the facts, or the current dominant theory in political science, which exaggerates the ideological component in judicial behavior. Ideology does figure into decision-making at all levels of the federal judiciary, the authors find, but its influence is not uniform. It diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts. As The Behavior of Federal Judges demonstrates, the good news is that ideology does not extinguish the influence of other components in judicial decision-making. Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aJudicial process
_zUnited States.
650 7 _aLAW / Judicial Power.
_2bisacsh
700 1 _aLandes, William M
_eautore
700 1 _aPosner, Richard A
_eautore
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674067325
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674067325
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780674067325.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c190356
_d190356