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019 _a(OCoLC)1013938348
020 _a9780674067080
_qprint
020 _a9780674067837
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.4159/harvard.9780674067837
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780674067837
035 _a(DE-B1597)177967
035 _a(OCoLC)840447171
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aBD418.3
_b.T36 2012
072 7 _aPHI015000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a128/.2
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aTanney, Julia
_eautore
245 1 0 _aRules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge /
_cJulia Tanney.
264 1 _aCambridge, MA :
_bHarvard University Press,
_c[2013]
264 4 _c©2012
300 _a1 online resource (328 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tIntroduction --
_t1. De-Individualizing Norms of Rationality (1995) --
_t2. Normativity and Thought (1999) --
_t3. Playing the Rule-Following Game (2000) --
_t4. Real Rules (2008) --
_t5. Why Reasons May Not Be Causes (1995) --
_t6. Reason-Explanation and the Contents of the Mind (2005) --
_t7. Reasons as Non-Causal, Context-Placing Explanations (2009) --
_t8. Pain, Polio, and Pride: Some Reflections on "Becausal" Explanations --
_t9. How To Resist Mental Representations (1998) --
_t10. On The Conceptual, Psychological, And Moral Status Of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, And Other "Behaviorally Indistinguishable" Creatures (2004) --
_t11. Conceptual Analysis, Theory Construction, and Philosophical Elucidation in the Philosophy of Mind --
_t12. Ryle's Regress and the Philosophy of Cognitive Science (2011) --
_t13. Some Constructivist Thoughts about Self-Knowledge (1996) --
_t14. Self-Knowledge, Normativity, and Construction (2002) --
_t15. Speaking One's Mind (2007) --
_t16. Conceptual Amorphousness, Reasons, and Causes --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tProvenance of Essays --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _a
520 _aJulia Tanney offers a sustained criticism of today's canon in philosophy of mind, which conceives the workings of the rational mind as the outcome of causal interactions between mental states that have their bases in the brain. With its roots in physicalism and functionalism, this widely accepted view provides the philosophical foundation for the cardinal tenet of the cognitive sciences: that cognition is a form of information-processing. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge presents a challenge not only to the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for the last fifty years but, more broadly, to metaphysical-empirical approaches to the study of the mind. Responding to a tradition that owes much to the writings of Davidson, early Putnam, and Fodor, Tanney challenges this orthodoxy on its own terms. In untangling its internal inadequacies, starting with the paradoxes of irrationality, she arrives at a view these philosophers were keen to rebut-one with affinities to the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and all but invisible to those working on the cutting edge of analytic philosophy and mind research today. This is the view that rational explanations are embedded in "thick" descriptions that are themselves sophistications upon ever ascending levels of discourse, or socio-linguistic practices. Tanney argues that conceptual cartography rather than metaphysical-scientific explanation is the basic tool for understanding the nature of the mind. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge clears the path for a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 15. Sep 2020)
650 0 _aCognitive science.
650 0 _aPhilosophy of mind.
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674067837
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674067837
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780674067837.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c190390
_d190390