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020			_a9780674058286 _qprint
020			_a9780674074453 _qPDF
024	7		_a10.4159/harvard.9780674074453 _2doi
035			_a(DE-B1597)9780674074453
035			_a(DE-B1597)209749
040			_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda
072		7	_aPOL040010 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a342.73/0412
084			_aonline - DeGruyter
100	1		_aGriffin, Stephen M. _eautore
245	1	0	_aLong Wars and the Constitution / / _cStephen M. Griffin.
264		1	_aCambridge, MA : : _bHarvard University Press, _c[2013]
264		4	_c©2013
300			_a1 online resource (374 p.) : _b1 table
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tContents -- _tList of Acronyms -- _tIntroduction -- _t1. War Powers and Constitutional Change -- _t2. Truman and the Post-1945 Constitutional Order -- _t3. War and the National Security State -- _t4. Vietnam and Watergate -- _t5. The Constitutional Order in the Post-Vietnam Era -- _t6. The 9/11 Wars and the Presidency -- _t7. A New Constitutional Order? -- _tAppendix: Executive Branch War Powers Opinions since 1950 -- _tNotes -- _tAcknowledgments -- _tIndex
506	0		_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star
520			_aIn a wide-ranging constitutional history of presidential war decisions from 1945 to the present, Stephen M. Griffin rethinks the long-running debate over the "imperial presidency" and concludes that the eighteenth-century Constitution is inadequate to the challenges of a post-9/11 world. The Constitution requires the consent of Congress before the United States can go to war. Truman's decision to fight in Korea without gaining that consent was unconstitutional, says Griffin, but the acquiescence of Congress and the American people created a precedent for presidents to claim autonomy in this arena ever since. The unthinking extension of presidential leadership in foreign affairs to a point where presidents unilaterally decide when to go to war, Griffin argues, has destabilized our constitutional order and deranged our foreign policy. Long Wars and the Constitution demonstrates the unexpected connections between presidential war power and the constitutional crises that have plagued American politics. Contemporary presidents are caught in a dilemma. On the one hand are the responsibilities handed over to them by a dangerous world, and on the other is an incapacity for sound decisionmaking in the absence of interbranch deliberation. President Obama's continuation of many Bush administration policies in the long war against terrorism is only the latest in a chain of difficulties resulting from the imbalances introduced by the post-1945 constitutional order. Griffin argues for beginning a cycle of accountability in which Congress would play a meaningful role in decisions for war, while recognizing the realities of twenty-first century diplomacy.
538			_aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 18. Sep 2023)
650		4	_a _v.
650		4	_aHISTORY / Military / General.
650		4	_aHISTORY / United States / General .
650		4	_aLAW / Constitutional.
650		4	_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General.
850			_aIT-RoAPU
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674074453
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674074453
856	4	2	_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780674074453/original
942			_cEB
999			_c190430 _d190430