000 04457nam a22005175i 4500
001 190986
003 IT-RoAPU
005 20221214232541.0
006 m|||||o||d||||||||
007 cr || ||||||||
008 220131t20221998mau fo d z eng d
020 _a9780674262638
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.4159/9780674262638
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780674262638
035 _a(DE-B1597)586304
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aKZ1301
_b.C48 1995
072 7 _aPOL000000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a341.3/7
_220
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aChayes, Abram
_eautore
245 1 4 _aThe New Sovereignty :
_bCompliance with International Regulatory Agreements /
_cAbram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes.
264 1 _aCambridge, MA :
_bHarvard University Press,
_c[2022]
264 4 _c©1998
300 _a1 online resource (417 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tPreface --
_tNote --
_t1 A Theory of Compliance --
_tI Sanctions --
_t2 Treaty-Based Military and Economic Sanctions --
_t3 Membership Sanctions --
_t4 Unilateral Sanctions --
_tII Toward a Strategy for Managing Compliance --
_t5 Norms --
_t6 Transparency, Norms, and Strategic Interaction --
_t7 Reporting and Data Collection --
_t8 Verification and Monitoring --
_t9 Instruments of Active Management --
_t10 Policy Review and Assessment --
_t11 Nongovernmental Organizations --
_t12 Revitalizing International Organizations --
_tAppendix: List of Treaties --
_tNotes --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aIn an increasingly complex and interdependent world, states resort to a bewildering array of regulatory agreements to deal with problems as disparate as climate change, nuclear proliferation, international trade, satellite communications, species destruction, and intellectual property. In such a system, there must be some means of ensuring reasonably reliable performance of treaty obligations. The standard approach to this problem, by academics and politicians alike, is a search for treaties with "teeth"--military or economic sanctions to deter and punish violation. The New Sovereignty argues that this approach is misconceived. Cases of coercive enforcement are rare, and sanctions are too costly and difficult to mobilize to be a reliable enforcement tool. As an alternative to this "enforcement" model, the authors propose a "managerial" model of treaty compliance. It relies on the elaboration and application of treaty norms in a continuing dialogue between the parties--international officials and nongovernmental organizations--that generates pressure to resolve problems of noncompliance. In the process, the norms and practices of the regime themselves evolve and develop. The authors take a broad look at treaties in many different areas: arms control, human rights, labor, the environment, monetary policy, and trade. The extraordinary wealth of examples includes the Iran airbus shootdown, Libya's suit against Great Britain and the United States in the Lockerbie case, the war in Bosnia, and Iraq after the Gulf War. The authors conclude that sovereignty--the status of a recognized actor in the international system--requires membership in good standing in the organizations and regimes through which the world manages its common affairs. This requirement turns out to be the major pressure for compliance with treaty obligations. This book will be an invaluable resource and casebook for scholars, policymakers, international public servants, lawyers, and corporate executives.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 31. Jan 2022)
650 0 _aCompliance.
650 0 _aSovereignty.
650 0 _aTreaties.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / General.
_2bisacsh
700 1 _aChayes, Antonia Handler
_eautore
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/9780674262638?locatt=mode:legacy
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674262638
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780674262638/original
942 _cEB
999 _c190986
_d190986