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001 191112
003 IT-RoAPU
005 20250106150324.0
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020 _a9780674274938
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.4159/9780674274938
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780674274938
035 _a(DE-B1597)613887
035 _a(OCoLC)1294425466
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aJC574
_b.M27 2004
072 7 _aPOL028000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a320.51/3
_222
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aMacGilvray, Eric A.
_eautore
245 1 0 _aReconstructing Public Reason /
_cEric A. MacGilvray.
264 1 _aCambridge, MA :
_bHarvard University Press,
_c[2004]
264 4 _c2004
300 _a1 online resource (266 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tAbbreviations --
_tIntroduction: The Task before Us --
_tI. TOWARD A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION --
_t1 The Tyranny of Minimalism --
_t2 Prospectivism and “The Will to Believe” --
_t3 Narrative and Moral Reasoning --
_tII PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY --
_t4 Against a Second Pragmatic Acquiescence --
_t5 Against Deweyan Democracy --
_tIII POLI TICAL LIBERALISM --
_t6 Political Liberalism and the Limits of the Political --
_t7 Public Reason and Public Institutions --
_t8 The Fact of Reasonable Pluralism --
_tConclusion: Liberalism after Minimalism --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aCan a liberal polity act on pressing matters of public concern in a way that respects the variety of beliefs and commitments that its citizens hold? Recent efforts to answer this question typically begin by seeking an uncontroversial starting point from which legitimate public ends can be said to follow. This reluctance to admit controversial beliefs as legitimate grounds for public action threatens to prevent us from responding effectively to many of the leading social and political challenges that we face. Eric MacGilvray argues that we should shift our attention away from the problem of identifying uncontroversial public ends in the present and toward the problem of evaluating potentially controversial public ends through collective inquiry over time. Rather than ask ourselves which public ends are justified, we must instead decide which public ends we should seek to justify. Reconstructing Public Reason offers a fundamental rethinking of the nature and aims of liberal toleration, and of the political implications of pragmatic philosophy. It also provides fresh interpretations of founding pragmatic thinkers such as John Dewey and William James, and of leading contemporary figures such as John Rawls and Richard Rorty.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Aug 2024)
650 0 _aLiberalism.
650 0 _aPolitical science.
650 0 _aPragmatism.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Public Policy / General.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/9780674274938?locatt=mode:legacy
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674274938
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780674274938/original
942 _cEB
999 _c191112
_d191112