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020 _a9780674725713
_qprint
020 _a9780674726062
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.4159/harvard.9780674726062
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780674726062
035 _a(DE-B1597)209585
035 _a(OCoLC)979954088
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
072 7 _aPHI013000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a149
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aRovane, Carol
_eautore
245 1 4 _aThe Metaphysics and Ethics of Relativism /
_cCarol Rovane.
264 1 _aCambridge, MA :
_bHarvard University Press,
_c[2013]
264 4 _c©2014
300 _a1 online resource (300 p.) :
_b1 halftone
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tIntroduction --
_tPART ONE How to Formulate the Doctrine of Relativism --
_t1 The Prevailing Consensus View: Disagreement, Relative Truth, and Antirealism --
_t2 Relativism as Multimundialism --
_tPART TWO Evaluating the Doctrine of Relativism --
_t3 Relativism concerning Natural Facts --
_t4 Relativism concerning Moral Values --
_tReferences --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aRelativism is a contested doctrine among philosophers, some of whom regard it as neither true nor false but simply incoherent. As Carol Rovane demonstrates in this tour-de-force, the way to defend relativism is not by establishing its truth but by clarifying its content. The Metaphysics and the Ethics of Relativism elaborates a doctrine of relativism that has a consistent logical, metaphysical, and practical significance. Relativism is worth debating, Rovane contends, because it bears directly on the moral choices we make in our lives. Rovane maintains that the most compelling conception of relativism is the "alternative intuition." Alternatives are truths that cannot be embraced together because they are not universal. Something other than logical contradiction excludes them. When this is so, logical relations no longer hold among all truth-value-bearers. Some truths will be irreconcilable between individuals even though they are valid in themselves. The practical consequence is that some forms of interpersonal engagement are confined within definite boundaries, and one has no choice but to view what lies beyond those boundaries with "epistemic indifference." In a very real sense, some people inhabit different worlds--true in themselves, but closed off to belief from those who hold irreducibly incompatible truths.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 24. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aEthics.
650 0 _aRelativity.
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / Metaphysics.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674726062
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674726062
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780674726062.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c193088
_d193088