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019 _a(OCoLC)979627574
020 _a9780674724570
_qprint
020 _a9780674726581
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.4159/harvard.9780674726581
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780674726581
035 _a(DE-B1597)213467
035 _a(OCoLC)867050097
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aBF41
_b.C73 2014eb
072 7 _aPHI015000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a150.1
_223
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aCrane, Tim
_eautore
245 1 0 _aAspects of Psychologism /
_cTim Crane.
264 1 _aCambridge, MA :
_bHarvard University Press,
_c[2014]
264 4 _c©2014
300 _a1 online resource (384 p.) :
_b1 line illustration
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tPreface --
_tESSAY ONE. Introduction: In Defence of Psychologism --
_tI Historical Essays --
_tII Intentionality --
_tIII Perception --
_tIV Consciousness --
_tNotes --
_tReferences --
_tCredits --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aAspects of Psychologism is a penetrating look into fundamental philosophical questions of consciousness, perception, and the experience we have of our mental lives. Psychologism, in Tim Crane's formulation, presents the mind as a single subject-matter to be investigated not only empirically and conceptually but also phenomenologically: through the systematic examination of consciousness and thought from the subject's point of view. How should we think about the mind? Analytical philosophy tends to address this question by examining the language we use to talk about our minds, and thus translates our knowledge of consciousness into knowledge of the concepts which this language embodies. Psychologism rejects this approach. The philosophy of mind, Crane contends, has become too narrow in its purely conceptual focus on the logical and linguistic formulas that structure thought. We cannot assume that the categories needed to understand the mind correspond absolutely with such semantic categories. Crane's claim is that intentionality--the "aboutness" or "directedness" of the mind--is essential to all mental phenomena. He criticizes materialist doctrines about consciousness and defends the position that perception can represent the world in a non-conceptual, non-propositional way, opening up philosophy to a more realistic account of the mind's nature.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aIntentionality (Philosophy).
650 0 _aPhenomenology.
650 0 _aPsychologism.
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674726581
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674726581
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780674726581.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c193133
_d193133