000 04191nam a22006015i 4500
001 193400
003 IT-RoAPU
005 20221214232716.0
006 m|||||o||d||||||||
007 cr || ||||||||
008 210830t20142014mau fo d z eng d
019 _a(OCoLC)979576865
020 _a9780674729100
_qprint
020 _a9780674735927
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.4159/harvard.9780674735927
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780674735927
035 _a(DE-B1597)427406
035 _a(OCoLC)891589886
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aE907
_b.E39 2012eb
072 7 _aPOL011000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a973.932092
_223
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aMacDonald, Michael
_eautore
245 1 0 _aOverreach :
_bDelusions of Regime Change in Iraq /
_cMichael MacDonald.
264 1 _aCambridge, MA :
_bHarvard University Press,
_c[2014]
264 4 _c©2014
300 _a1 online resource (336 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tIntroduction --
_tONE Why Elect a Self- Defeating War? --
_tTWO. Bring 'Em On: Making the World Safe for Democracy --
_tTHREE. What Went Wrong: The Decapitationist Consensus of Washington Elites --
_tFOUR. What Were Neoconservatives Thinking? --
_tFIVE. Demo cratic Hawks --
_tSIX. American Exceptionalism Meets Iraqi History --
_tSEVEN. The Semi- Sovereign Shi'i State --
_tConclusion --
_tNotes --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aIn the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a fair number of Americans thought the idea was crazy. Now everyone, except a few die-hards, thinks it was. So what was going through the minds of the talented and experienced men and women who planned and initiated the war? What were their assumptions? Overreach aims to recover those presuppositions. Michael MacDonald examines the standard hypotheses for the decision to attack, showing them to be either wrong or of secondary importance: the personality of President George W. Bush, including his relationship with his father; Republican electoral considerations; the oil lobby; the Israeli lobby. He also undermines the argument that the war failed because of the Bush administration's incompetence. The more fundamental reasons for the Iraq War and its failure, MacDonald argues, are located in basic axioms of American foreign policy, which equate America's ideals with its interests (distorting both in the process) and project those ideals as universally applicable. Believing that democratic principles would bring order to Iraq naturally and spontaneously, regardless of the region's history and culture or what Iraqis themselves wanted, neoconservative thinkers, with support from many on the left, advocated breaking the back of state power under Saddam Hussein. They maintained that by bringing about radical regime change, the United States was promoting liberalism, capitalism, and democracy in Iraq. But what it did instead was unleash chaos.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aExecutive power
_zUnited States
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aIraq War, 2003-2011
_xCauses.
650 0 _aIraq War, 2003-2011
_xDecision making.
650 0 _aIraq War, 2003-2011
_xPolitical aspects.
650 0 _aLeadership
_zUnited States
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aPolitical leadership
_zUnited States
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aPresidents
_zUnited States
_vCase studies.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674735927
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674735927
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780674735927.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c193400
_d193400