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008 210830t20142014mau fo d z eng d
019 _a(OCoLC)979723447
020 _a9780674058149
_qprint
020 _a9780674736016
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.4159/harvard.9780674736016
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780674736016
035 _a(DE-B1597)427415
035 _a(OCoLC)894668607
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
072 7 _aHIS027110
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a355.00922
_223
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aMoten, Matthew
_eautore
245 1 0 _aPresidents and Their Generals :
_bAn American History of Command in War /
_cMatthew Moten.
264 1 _aCambridge, MA :
_bHarvard University Press,
_c[2014]
264 4 _c©2014
300 _a1 online resource (416 p.) :
_b1 halftone
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tCONTENTS --
_tPreface --
_tINTRODUCTION --
_tI. SETTING PRECEDENTS --
_t1. George Washington and the Continental Congress --
_t2. Adams, Washington, and Hamilton --
_t3. Mr. Madison's War --
_t4. Polk against His Generals --
_t5. Lincoln's Letter to Hooker --
_tII. THE POLITICS OF COLLABORATION --
_t6. Lincoln and Grant --
_t7. The Pershing Paradox --
_t8. Roosevelt, Marshall, and Hopkins --
_tIII. THE PERILS OF PARTISANSHIP --
_t9. Exit MacArthur --
_t10. Taylor's Theory --
_t11. Powell's Doctrine --
_t12. Rumsfeld's Assumptions --
_tConclusion --
_tNotes --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aSince World War II, the United States has been engaged in near-constant military conflict abroad, often with ill-defined objectives, ineffectual strategy, and uncertain benefits. In this era of limited congressional oversight and "wars of choice," the executive and the armed services have shared the primary responsibility for making war. The negotiations between presidents and their generals thus grow ever more significant, and understanding them becomes essential. Matthew Moten traces a sweeping history of the evolving roles of civilian and military leaders in conducting war, demonstrating how war strategy and national security policy shifted as political and military institutions developed, and how they were shaped by leaders' personalities. Early presidents established the principle of military subordination to civil government, and from the Civil War to World War II the president's role as commander-in-chief solidified, with an increasingly professionalized military offering its counsel. But General Douglas MacArthur's insubordination to President Harry Truman during the Korean War put political-military tensions on public view. Subsequent presidents selected generals who would ally themselves with administration priorities. Military commanders in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan did just that-and the results were poorly conceived policy and badly executed strategy. The most effective historical collaborations between presidents and their generals were built on mutual respect for military expertise and civilian authority, and a willingness to negotiate with candor and competence. Upon these foundations, future soldiers and statesmen can ensure effective decision-making in the event of war and bring us closer to the possibility of peace.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aCivil-military relations
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
650 0 _aCommand of troops
_xHistory.
650 0 _aGenerals
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
650 0 _aPresidents
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
650 7 _aHISTORY / Military / United States.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674736016
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674736016
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780674736016.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c193409
_d193409