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020 _a9780691120058
_qprint
020 _a9780691186313
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9780691186313
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780691186313
035 _a(DE-B1597)501604
035 _a(OCoLC)1076450242
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aHB144
_b.B328 2006eb
072 7 _aBUS069030
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a330/.01/5193
_222
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aBacharach, Michael
_eautore
245 1 0 _aBeyond Individual Choice :
_bTeams and Frames in Game Theory /
_cMichael Bacharach; ed. by Robert Sugden, Natalie Gold.
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2018]
264 4 _c©2006
300 _a1 online resource
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tList of Illustrations --
_tList of Tables --
_tForeword --
_tPreface --
_tIntroduction --
_tChapter 1. The Hi-Lo Paradox --
_tChapter 2. Groups --
_tChapter 3. The Evolution of Group Action --
_tChapter 4. Team Thinking --
_tConclusion --
_tReferences --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aGame theory is central to modern understandings of how people deal with problems of coordination and cooperation. Yet, ironically, it cannot give a straightforward explanation of some of the simplest forms of human coordination and cooperation--most famously, that people can use the apparently arbitrary features of "focal points" to solve coordination problems, and that people sometimes cooperate in "prisoner's dilemmas." Addressing a wide readership of economists, sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers, Michael Bacharach here proposes a revision of game theory that resolves these long-standing problems. In the classical tradition of game theory, Bacharach models human beings as rational actors, but he revises the standard definition of rationality to incorporate two major new ideas. He enlarges the model of a game so that it includes the ways agents describe to themselves (or "frame") their decision problems. And he allows the possibility that people reason as members of groups (or "teams"), each taking herself to have reason to perform her component of the combination of actions that best achieves the group's common goal. Bacharach shows that certain tendencies for individuals to engage in team reasoning are consistent with recent findings in social psychology and evolutionary biology. As the culmination of Bacharach's long-standing program of pathbreaking work on the foundations of game theory, this book has been eagerly awaited. Following Bacharach's premature death, Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden edited the unfinished work and added two substantial chapters that allow the book to be read as a coherent whole.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aEconomics, Mathematical.
650 0 _aGame theory.
650 7 _aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Theory.
_2bisacsh
700 1 _aGold, Natalie
_ecuratore
700 1 _aSugden, Robert
_ecuratore
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9780691186313?locatt=mode:legacy
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780691186313
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780691186313.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c194204
_d194204