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020 _a9780691213064
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9780691213064
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780691213064
035 _a(DE-B1597)554850
035 _a(OCoLC)1158118763
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
072 7 _aHIS027130
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a363.17/9
_223
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aSagan, Scott Douglas
_eautore
245 1 4 _aThe Limits of Safety :
_bOrganizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons /
_cScott Douglas Sagan.
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2020]
264 4 _c©1993
300 _a1 online resource (302 p.) :
_b8 figs. 5 tables
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aPrinceton Studies in International History and Politics ;
_v177
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tFigures and Tables --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tAcronyms --
_tIntroduction. Expecting the Unexpected --
_tChapter 1. The Origins of Accidents --
_tChapter 2. Nuclear Weapons Safety during the Cuban Missile Crisis --
_tChapter 3. Intelligence and Warning during the Cuban Missile Crisis --
_tChapter 4. Redundancy and Reliability: The 1968 Thule Bomber Accident --
_tChapter 5. Learning by Trial and Terror --
_tChapter 6. The Limits of Safety --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aEnvironmental tragedies such as Chernobyl and the Exxon Valdez remind us that catastrophic accidents are always possible in a world full of hazardous technologies. Yet, the apparently excellent safety record with nuclear weapons has led scholars, policy-makers, and the public alike to believe that nuclear arsenals can serve as a secure deterrent for the foreseeable future. In this provocative book, Scott Sagan challenges such optimism. Sagan's research into formerly classified archives penetrates the veil of safety that has surrounded U.S. nuclear weapons and reveals a hidden history of frightening "close calls" to disaster.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aNuclear weapons
_xAccidents
_zUnited States.
650 0 _aNuclear weapons
_zUnited States
_xSafety measures.
650 7 _aHISTORY / Military / Wars & Conflicts (Other).
_2bisacsh
653 _aAirline accidents.
653 _aBomb alarm system.
653 _aBundy, McGeorge.
653 _aChernobyl accident.
653 _aCivilian oversight.
653 _aCulture of reliability.
653 _aDEFCON 1 alert.
653 _aEscalation potential.
653 _aFail-safe system.
653 _aGarbage can model.
653 _aGreat Britain.
653 _aHartinger, James.
653 _aICBM operations.
653 _aInteractive complexity.
653 _aKennedy, John R.
653 _aMarch, James.
653 _aMental stability.
653 _aMissile forces.
653 _aNavigational errors.
653 _aNuclear proliferation.
653 _aOperator error.
653 _aOrganizational culture.
653 _aPersonnel redundancy.
653 _aRules of engagement.
653 _aSoviet Union.
653 _aTest launches.
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9780691213064?locatt=mode:legacy
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780691213064
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780691213064.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c194977
_d194977