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001			195364
003			IT-RoAPU
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008			211129t20211999nju fo d z eng d
020			_a9780691222028 _qPDF
024	7		_a10.1515/9780691222028 _2doi
035			_a(DE-B1597)9780691222028
035			_a(DE-B1597)576157
040			_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda
072		7	_aPHI004000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a121
084			_aonline - DeGruyter
245	0	0	_aGroundless Belief : _bAn Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology - Second Edition / _cMichael Williams.
264		1	_aPrinceton, NJ : _bPrinceton University Press, _c[2021]
264		4	_c©1999
300			_a1 online resource (208 p.)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tContents -- _tAcknowledgments -- _tPreface to the Second Edition -- _t1. Introduction: Epistemology and Scepticism -- _t2. The Appeal to the Given -- _t3. The Regress of Justification -- _t4. Meaning or Theory? -- _t5. Basic Propositions -- _tAfterword -- _tIndex
506	0		_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star
520			_aInspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "phenomenalism," the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a perceptual or experiential foundation. The point of this wider-than-normal usage of the term "phenomenalism," according to which even some forms of direct realism deserve to be called phenomenalistic, is to call attention to important continuities of thought between theories often thought to be competitors. Williams's target is not phenomenalism in its classical sense-datum and reductionist form but empiricism generally. Williams examines and rejects the idea that, unless our beliefs are answerable to a "given" element in experience, objective knowledge will be impossible. Groundless Belief was first published in 1977. This second edition contains a new afterword in which Williams places his arguments in the context of some current discussions of coherentism versus the Myth of the Given and explains their relation to subsequent developments in his own epistemological views.
538			_aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Nov 2021)
650		0	_aKnowledge, Theory of.
650		7	_aPHILOSOPHY / Epistemology. _2bisacsh
653			_aArmstrong, D. M.
653			_aAustin, J. L.
653			_aAyer, A. J.
653			_aBennett, J.
653			_aBerkeley.
653			_aBlanshard, B.
653			_aBradley, F. H.
653			_aCarnap, R.
653			_aChisholm, R.
653			_aCornman, J.
653			_aDescartes.
653			_aDewey, J.
653			_aField, H.
653			_aFirth, R.
653			_aGettier, E.
653			_aGoodman, N.
653			_aGreen, T. H.
653			_aGrice, H. P.
653			_aHahn, H.
653			_aHarman, G.
653			_aHume.
653			_aLewis, C.I.
653			_aLocke.
653			_aMalcolm, N.
653			_aMates, B.
653			_aMoore, G.E.
653			_aNeurath, O.
653			_aPaul, G. A.
653			_aPlato.
653			_aPollock, J.
653			_aPopkin, R. H.
653			_aPrice, H. H.
653			_aQuine, W. V.
653			_aQuinton, A.
653			_aReichenbach, H.
653			_aRorty, R.
653			_aRoss, J. J.
653			_aRussell, B.
653			_aSchlick, M.
653			_aSellars, W.
653			_aShoemaker, S.
653			_aTarski, A.
653			_aThompson, J.
653			_aUnger, P.
653			_aWittgenstein, L.
700	1		_aWilliams, Michael _eautore
850			_aIT-RoAPU
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9780691222028?locatt=mode:legacy
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780691222028
856	4	2	_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780691222028/original
942			_cEB
999			_c195364 _d195364