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001 195572
003 IT-RoAPU
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008 220729t20221997nju fo d z eng d
010 _a2020759453
020 _a9780691227511
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9780691227511
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780691227511
035 _a(DE-B1597)576690
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 0 0 _aE183.8.G3
050 4 _aE183.8.G3
_b.F376 1997
072 7 _aHIS036060
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a940.532273
_223
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aFarnham, Barbara Reardon
_eautore
245 1 0 _aRoosevelt and the Munich Crisis :
_bA Study of Political Decision-Making /
_cBarbara Reardon Farnham.
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2022]
264 4 _c©1997
300 _a1 online resource (328 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aPrinceton Studies in International History and Politics ;
_v190
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tPreface --
_tAbbreviations Used in the Footnotes --
_tChapter I Roosevelt, the Munich Crisis, and Political Decision-Making --
_tPart One THEORY --
_tChapter II The Political Approach to Decision-Making --
_tPART TWO: ROOSEVELT AND THE MUNICH CRISIS --
_tChapter III The "Watershed" between Two Wars: 1936-1938 --
_tChapter IV The Munich Crisis --
_tChapter V Assessing the Munich Crisis --
_tChapter VI Dealing with the Consequences of Munich --
_tChapter VII Implications for History and Theory --
_tAppendix A Traditional Approaches to Decision-Making --
_tAppendix B Analyzing the Calculus of Political Feasibility: The Nature of the Acceptability Constraint --
_tAppendix C The Traditional Political Strategies --
_tBibliography --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aFranklin Roosevelt's intentions during the three years between Munich and Pearl Harbor have been a source of controversy among historians for decades. Barbara Farnham offers both a theory of how the domestic political context affects foreign policy decisions in general and a fresh interpretation of FDR's post-Munich policies based on the insights that the theory provides. Between 1936 and 1938, Roosevelt searched for ways to influence the deteriorating international situation. When Hitler's behavior during the Munich crisis showed him to be incorrigibly aggressive, FDR settled on aiding the democracies, a course to which he adhered until America's entry into the war. This policy attracted him because it allowed him to deal with a serious problem: the conflict between the need to stop Hitler and the domestic imperative to avoid any risk of American involvement in a war. Because existing theoretical approaches to value conflict ignore the influence of political factors on decision-making, they offer little help in explaining Roosevelt's behavior. As an alternative, this book develops a political approach to decision-making which focuses on the impact that awareness of the imperatives of the political context can have on decision-making processes and, through them, policy outcomes. It suggests that in the face of a clash of central values decision-makers who are aware of the demands of the political context are likely to be reluctant to make trade-offs, seeking instead a solution that gives some measure of satisfaction to all the values implicated in the decision.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jul 2022)
650 7 _aHISTORY / United States / 20th Century.
_2bisacsh
653 _aAcceptability.
653 _aAid to democracies.
653 _aAirpower.
653 _aAppeasement.
653 _aAuthoritarian government.
653 _aBehavioral Decision Theory.
653 _aBelief systems.
653 _aBerchtesgaden.
653 _aBlockade.
653 _aBolstering.
653 _aBuck-passing.
653 _aBureaucratic politics.
653 _aCase studies.
653 _aCharlottesville Program.
653 _aCognitive effort.
653 _aCompromise.
653 _aConsensus.
653 _aConsistency.
653 _aCzechoslovakia.
653 _aDecision rules.
653 _aDemocratic peace.
653 _aDiesing, Paul.
653 _aDror, Yehezkel.
653 _aEmerson, William.
653 _aEurope.
653 _aFrance.
653 _aGeorge, Alexander.
653 _aGodesberg meeting.
653 _aGood Neighbor Policy.
653 _aHaglund, David.
653 _aHelium controversy.
653 _aHull, Cordell.
653 _aHyde Park meetings.
653 _aIncrementalism.
653 _aInterventionists.
653 _aIsolationism.
653 _aJouaux, Leon.
653 _aKeynes, John Maynard.
653 _aLevels of analysis.
653 _aLindsay, Sir Ronald.
653 _aLothian, Lord.
653 _aNine Power Conference.
653 _aOpportunity costs.
653 _aOptimizing.
653 _aPlausibility probe.
653 _aPolicy analysts.
653 _aRainbow Plans.
653 _aRearmament.
653 _aRoosevelt administration.
653 _aSearch-design continuum.
653 _aneutrality.
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9780691227511?locatt=mode:legacy
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780691227511
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780691227511/original
942 _cEB
999 _c195572
_d195572