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019 _a(OCoLC)979756015
020 _a9780801449147
_qprint
020 _a9780801460036
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.7591/9780801460036
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780801460036
035 _a(DE-B1597)480085
035 _a(OCoLC)732957115
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
072 7 _aPOL012000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a355/.03351
_222
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aTwomey, Christopher P.
_eautore
245 1 4 _aThe Military Lens :
_bDoctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations /
_cChristopher P. Twomey.
264 1 _aIthaca, NY :
_bCornell University Press,
_c[2011]
264 4 _c©2011
300 _a1 online resource (272 p.) :
_b1 halftone, 3 tables, 5 maps, 1 line drawing
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aCornell Studies in Security Affairs
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tPreface --
_tPart I. The Dangers of Doctrinal Difference --
_t1. The Military Language of Diplomacy --
_t2. Doctrinal Differences and Misperception --
_tPart II. Chinese and American Puzzles --
_t3. Comparing Theories of Victory: Facing Off over Korea --
_t4. The United States Crosses the 38th Parallel --
_t5. China Crosses the Yalu --
_t6. China Postpones the Invasion of Taiwan --
_tPart III. Extending The Story --
_t7. The Emergence of Doctrinal Differences in the Middle East, 1956 to 1973 --
_t8. Implications for Theory and Dangers in the Taiwan Strait Today --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aIn The Military Lens, Christopher P. Twomey shows how differing military doctrines have led to misperceptions between the United States and China over foreign policy-and the potential dangers these might pose in future relations. Because of their different strategic situations, histories, and military cultures, nations may have radically disparate definitions of effective military doctrine, strategy, and capabilities. Twomey argues that when such doctrines-or "theories of victory"-differ across states, misperceptions about a rival's capabilities and intentions and false optimism about one's own are more likely to occur. In turn, these can impede international diplomacy and statecraft by making it more difficult to communicate and agree on assessments of the balance of power.When states engage in strategic coercion-either to deter or to compel action-such problems can lead to escalation and war. Twomey assesses a wide array of sources in both the United States and China on military doctrine, strategic culture, misperception, and deterrence theory to build case studies of attempts at strategic coercion during Sino-American conflicts in Korea and the Taiwan Strait in the early years of the Cold War, as well as an examination of similar issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict. After demonstrating how these factors have contributed to past conflicts, Twomey amply documents the persistence of hazardous miscommunication in contemporary Sino-American relations. His unique analytic perspective on military capability suggests that policymakers need to carefully consider the military doctrine of the nations they are trying to influence.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022)
650 4 _aAsian Studies.
650 4 _aPolitical Science & Political History.
650 4 _aSecurity Studies.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International).
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.7591/9780801460036
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780801460036
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780801460036/original
942 _cEB
999 _c197358
_d197358