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001 198880
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008 210830t20142015pau fo d z eng d
019 _a(OCoLC)979904942
020 _a9780812246513
_qprint
020 _a9780812290264
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.9783/9780812290264
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780812290264
035 _a(DE-B1597)450988
035 _a(OCoLC)893686330
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aJF
072 7 _aPOL022000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a352.23
_223
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aMcEvoy, Joanne
_eautore
245 1 0 _aPower-Sharing Executives :
_bGoverning in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland /
_cJoanne McEvoy.
264 1 _aPhiladelphia :
_bUniversity of Pennsylvania Press,
_c[2014]
264 4 _c©2015
300 _a1 online resource (288 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aNational and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tCONTENTS --
_t1. Power Sharing, Institutional Design, and External Act --
_tPART I. NORTHERN IRELAND --
_t2. The Sunningdale Executive: Lessons from Failed Power Sharing --
_t3. The Good Friday Agreement 1998: An Inclusive Co ali tion --
_t4. The 2007-11 Executive: A New Era in Northern Ireland Politics? --
_tPART II. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA --
_t5. Power-Sharing Stalemate in Post- Dayton Bosnia --
_t6. From Dayton to Brussels? --
_tPART III. MACEDONIA --
_t7. Macedonia: From Independence to the Ohrid Framework Agreement --
_t8. Toward a Binational Macedonia? --
_tConclusion --
_tNotes --
_tIndex --
_tAcknowledgments
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aTo achieve peaceful interethnic relations and a stable democracy in the aftermath of violent conflict, institutional designers may task political elites representing previously warring sides with governing a nation together. In Power-Sharing Executives, Joanne McEvoy asks whether certain institutional rules can promote cooperation between political parties representing the contending groups in a deeply divided place. Examining the different experiences of postconflict power sharing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland, she finds that with certain incentives and norms in place, power sharing can indeed provide political space for an atmosphere of joint governance or accommodation between groups.Power-Sharing Executives explains how the institutional design process originated and evolved in each of the three nations and investigates the impact of institutional rules on interethnic cooperation. McEvoy also looks at the role of external actors such as international organizations in persuading political elites to agree to share power and to implement power-sharing peace agreements. This comparative analysis of institutional formation and outcomes shows how coalitions of varying inclusivity or with different rules can bring about a successful if delicate consociationality in practice. Power-Sharing Executives offers prescriptions for policymakers facing the challenges of mediating peace in a postconflict society and sheds light on the wider study of peace promotion.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aCultural pluralism
_vPolitical aspects
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aCultural pluralism
_xPolitical aspects
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aEthnic conflict
_vPolitical aspects
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aEthnic conflict
_xPolitical aspects
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aEthnic groups
_vPolitical activity
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aEthnic groups
_xPolitical activity
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aMinorities
_vPolitical activity
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aMinorities
_xPolitical activity
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aRepresentative government and representation
_vCase studies.
650 4 _aPublic Policy.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Constitutions.
_2bisacsh
653 _aPolitical Science.
653 _aPublic Policy.
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.9783/9780812290264
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780812290264
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780812290264.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c198880
_d198880