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019 _a(OCoLC)979756943
020 _a9780812246681
_qprint
020 _a9780812292046
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.9783/9780812292046
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780812292046
035 _a(DE-B1597)453331
035 _a(OCoLC)901291154
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
072 7 _aPOL037000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a363.325/17
_223
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aWilner, Alex S.
_eautore
245 1 0 _aDeterring Rational Fanatics /
_cAlex S. Wilner.
264 1 _aPhiladelphia :
_bUniversity of Pennsylvania Press,
_c[2015]
264 4 _c©2015
300 _a1 online resource (264 p.) :
_b18 illus.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tChapter 1. Introduction --
_tChapter 2. Deterrence Theory: Exploring Core Concepts --
_tChapter 3. Deterring Terrorism: Contemporary Debates --
_tChapter 4. Targeted Killings: Theory, Practice, and Consequence --
_tChapter 5. Targeting the Taliban: Coercive Lessons fromAfghanistan --
_tChapter 6. Moving Ahead with Deterrence Theory --
_tAppendix: Research Design and Methodology --
_tNotes --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aCold War-era strategic thinking was driven by the belief that individuals, organizations, and foreign states could be deterred from offensive action by the threat of reprisal. That assurance was shaken with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; suddenly, it seemed that no threat was powerful enough to deter individuals or organizations that valued political objectives over their own lives and the lives of their members. More than a decade later, new research and theory are bringing deterrence back into currency as a viable counterterrorism strategy. Alex S. Wilner updates deterrence theory for conflict in the twenty-first century, arguing for its value against challengers such as rogue states, cyber warriors, and transnational terrorist organizations.Deterring Rational Fanatics provides a full-scale discussion of deterrence theory concepts and controversies, assessing the utility of relying on the logic of deterrence and coercion to counter contemporary terrorism. In particular, targeted killings directed against the Taliban of Afghanistan provide a vivid illustration of the impact deterrence can have on militant behavior: precision strikes that eliminate militant leaders represent a significant cost to planning and participating in political violence, a cost that can coerce, manipulate, and alter behavior. Though deterrence theory is not a panacea for terrorism, insurgency, or militancy, it can serve as a strategic guide for state responses; as Wilner shows, terrorist violence can indeed be deterred.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 4 _aPublic Policy.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Terrorism.
_2bisacsh
653 _aPolitical Science.
653 _aPublic Policy.
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.9783/9780812292046
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780812292046
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780812292046.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c199011
_d199011