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020 _a9780812295023
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.9783/9780812295023
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780812295023
035 _a(DE-B1597)497867
035 _a(OCoLC)1031214242
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aHV6431
072 7 _aPOL037000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a363.325
_223
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aBacon, Tricia
_eautore
245 1 0 _aWhy Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances /
_cTricia Bacon.
264 1 _aPhiladelphia :
_bUniversity of Pennsylvania Press,
_c[2018]
264 4 _c©2018
300 _a1 online resource (352 p.) :
_b2 illus.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tIntroduction --
_tChapter 2. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Pioneering Partnerships --
_tChapter 3. The Red Army Faction: Pursuing Palestinian Partners --
_tChapter 4. Al-Qaida Before 9/11: Building Alliances One Dollar at a Time --
_tChapter 5. Al-Qaida After 9/11: Calling in Debts and Capitalizing on Cachet --
_tChapter 6. Egyptian Jihadist Groups: Divergent Solutions, Similar Problems --
_tConclusion --
_tNotes --
_tIndex --
_tAcknowledgments
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aTerrorist groups with a shared enemy or ideology have ample reason to work together, even if they are primarily pursuing different causes. Although partnering with another terrorist organization has the potential to bolster operational effectiveness, efficiency, and prestige, international alliances may expose partners to infiltration, security breaches, or additional counterterrorism attention. Alliances between such organizations, which are suspicious and secretive by nature, must also overcome significant barriers to trust—the exposure to risk must be balanced by the promise of increased lethality, resiliency, and longevity.In Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances, Tricia Bacon argues that although it may seem natural for terrorist groups to ally, groups actually face substantial hurdles when attempting to ally and, when alliances do form, they are not evenly distributed across pairs. Instead, she demonstrates that when terrorist groups seek allies to obtain new skills, knowledge, or capacities for resource acquisition and mobilization, only a few groups have the ability to provide needed training, safe haven, infrastructure, or cachet. Consequently, these select few emerge as preferable partners and become hubs around which other groups cluster. According to Bacon, shared enemies and common ideologies do not cause alliances to form but create affinity to bind partners and guide partner selection.Bacon examines partnerships formed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Al-Qaida, and Egyptian jihadist groups, among others, in a series of case studies spanning the dawn of international terrorism in the 1960s to the present. Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances advances our understanding of the motivations of terrorist alliances and offers insights useful to counterterrorism efforts to disrupt these dangerous relationships.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aInternational relations and terrorism
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aTerrorism
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aTerrorism
_xPrevention
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aTerrorist organizations
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aTerrorists
_vCase studies.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Terrorism.
_2bisacsh
653 _aPolitical Science.
653 _aPublic Policy.
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.9783/9780812295023
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780812295023
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780812295023.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c199268
_d199268