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008 220302t19951995hiu fo d z eng d
020 _a9780824863982
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9780824863982
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780824863982
035 _a(DE-B1597)483864
035 _a(OCoLC)1024051607
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aJQ1522
_b.Z43 1996
072 7 _aPOL000000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a320.951/09/041
_220
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aZhao, Suisheng
_eautore
245 1 0 _aPower by Design :
_bConstitution-Making in Nationalist China /
_cSuisheng Zhao.
264 1 _aHonolulu :
_bUniversity of Hawaii Press,
_c[1995]
264 4 _c©1995
300 _a1 online resource (232 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tNote on Romanization --
_tAbbreviations --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tCHAPTER 1. Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings --
_tCHAPTER 2. The Rise of Constitutionalism --
_tCHAPTER 3. Power Resources and Authority Relationships --
_tCHAPTER 4. Relative Power Positions of the Major Players --
_tCHAPTER 5. Institutional Preferences of the Major Players --
_tCHAPTER 6. The Succession Struggle: From Cabinet to Presidential Government, 1925–1928 --
_tCHAPTER 7. The Grand Anti-Chiang Coalition: From Presidential to Cabinet Government, 1928–1931 --
_tCHAPTER 8. The Destruction of Chiang’s Major Rivals: From Cabinet Back to Presidentia Government, 1931–1937 --
_tCHAPTER 9. Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective --
_tNotes --
_tSelected Bibliography --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aFirst established as a cabinet system in Guangzhou in 1925, the Nationalist Government of China was replaced three years later by a presidential system under a unified Nationalist government in Nanjing. The cabinet government was restored in 1931 and existed until the presidential system was again installed by the 1936 constitution. Why did presidential and cabinet systems exist alternately during this formative period of the Nationalist government? Why was the presidential system finally adopted in 1936? Suisheng Zhao answers these and other questions fundamental to understanding authoritarian regimes in this pioneering study of the design of the Nationalist Government of China from 1925 to 1937. although scholars of comparative politics have shown great interest in the institutional choice between parliamentarianism and presidentialism in democratic countries, they have paid little attention to the study of constitutional frameworks in authoritarian settings. By offering a clear and original re-interpretation of the history of this power struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and his rivals over institutional design, Zhao challenges the conventional wisdom that has underestimated the importance of formal institutions in non-democratic regimes.Borrowing ideas from public choice theory, Zhao proposes that political actors who design governmental institutions are diven by power-maximization strategies just as business firms are driven by wealth-maximization strategies. Constitution-making reflects the underlying distribution of power among authoritarian leaders, who attempt to design political institutions that will consolidate their personal power and position. Thus, Zhao argues, if political actors possess more power resources than their rivals and anticipate themselves becoming dominant, they will choose the singular leadership of the presidential system. If they are in a weaker position and do not anticipate becoming dominant, they will prefer the collective leadership of the cabinet form of government.Notable for its persuasive integration of political science theory and the historical evidence, Power by Design is an insightful re-interpretation of Chinese history that will be welcomed by scholars of modern China and those interested in the consequences of the nationalist politics that continue to reverberate in contemporary Chine, as well as by comparative political scientists studying constitution-making and institutional design.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022)
650 0 _aConstitutional history
_zTaiwan.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / General.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9780824863982
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780824863982
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780824863982/original
942 _cEB
999 _c203931
_d203931