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001 205163
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008 210830t19981995nju fo d z eng d
019 _a(OCoLC)984682156
020 _a9780691002422
_qprint
020 _a9781400821747
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400821747
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400821747
035 _a(DE-B1597)447730
035 _a(OCoLC)979685235
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aJX5003
072 7 _aPOL011000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a325.320904
_a325/.32/0904
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aLiberman, Peter
_eautore
245 1 0 _aDoes Conquest Pay? :
_bThe Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies /
_cPeter Liberman.
250 _aCourse Book
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[1998]
264 4 _c©1995
300 _a1 online resource (264 p.) :
_b4 line illus. 26 tables
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aPrinceton Studies in International History and Politics ;
_v74
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tFigures and Tables --
_tPreface and Acknowledgments --
_tChapter 1. Does Conquest Pay? --
_tChapter 2. When Does Conquest Pay? --
_tChapter 3. Nazi-Occupied Western Europe, 1940-1944 --
_tChapter 4. Belgium and Luxembourg, 1914-1918 --
_tChapter 5. The Ruhr-Rhineland, 1923-1924 --
_tChapter 6. The Japanese Empire, 1910-1945 --
_tChapter 7. The Soviet Empire, 1945-1989 --
_tChapter 8. The Spoils of Conquest --
_tNotes --
_tWorks Cited --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aCan foreign invaders successfully exploit industrial economies? Since control over economic resources is a key source of power, the answer affects the likelihood of aggression and how strenuously states should counter it. The resurgence of nationalism has led many policymakers and scholars to doubt that conquest still pays. But, until now, the "cumulativity" of industrial resources has never been subjected to systematic analysis. Does Conquest Pay? demonstrates that expansion can, in fact, provide rewards to aggressor nations. Peter Liberman argues that invaders can exploit industrial societies for short periods of time and can maintain control and economic performance over the long term. This is because modern societies are uniquely vulnerable to coercion and repression. Hence, by wielding a gun in one hand and offering food with the other, determined conquerors can compel collaboration and suppress resistance. Liberman's argument is supported by several historical case studies: Germany's capture of Belgium and Luxembourg during World War I and of nearly all of Europe during World War II; France's seizure of the Ruhr in 1923-24; the Japanese Empire during 1910-45; and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in 1945-89. Does Conquest Pay? suggests that the international system is more war-prone than many optimists claim. Liberman's findings also contribute to debates about the stability of empires and other authoritarian regimes, the effectiveness of national resistance strategies, and the sources of rebellious collective action.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aMilitary occupation
_xCase studies
_xEconomic aspects.
650 0 _aMilitary occupation
_xEconomic aspects
_vCase studies.
650 0 _aMilitary occupation
_xEconomic aspects.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400821747
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400821747
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400821747.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c205163
_d205163