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019 _a(OCoLC)984663605
020 _a9780691049267
_qprint
020 _a9781400824250
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400824250
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400824250
035 _a(DE-B1597)447643
035 _a(OCoLC)979629081
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aJK1021 .S35 2008
072 7 _aPOL006000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a328.73/09
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aSchickler, Eric
_eautore
245 1 0 _aDisjointed Pluralism :
_bInstitutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress /
_cEric Schickler.
250 _aCore Textbook
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2011]
264 4 _c©2001
300 _a1 online resource (376 p.) :
_b4 line illus., 19 tables
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aPrinceton Studies in American Politics: Historical, International, and Comparative Perspectives ;
_v124
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tFigures --
_tTables --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tChapter 1. Disjointed Pluralism and Institutional Change --
_tChapter 2. Institutional Development, 1890-1910: An Experiment in Party Government --
_tChapter 3. Institutional Development, 1919-1932: Cross-Party Coalitions, Bloc Government, and Republican Rule --
_tChapter 4. Institutional Development, 1937-1952: The Conservative Coalition, Congress against the Executive, and Committee Government --
_tChapter 5. Institutional Development, 1970-1989: A Return to Party Government or the Triumph of Individualism? --
_tChapter 6. Understanding Congressional Change --
_tEpilogue. Institutional Change in the 1990s --
_tAppendix A. Case Selection --
_tAppendix B. Votes Pertaining to Institutional Changes in Each Period --
_tNotes --
_tReferences --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aFrom the 1910 overthrow of "Czar" Joseph Cannon to the reforms enacted when Republicans took over the House in 1995, institutional change within the U.S. Congress has been both a product and a shaper of congressional politics. For several decades, scholars have explained this process in terms of a particular collective interest shared by members, be it partisanship, reelection worries, or policy motivations. Eric Schickler makes the case that it is actually interplay among multiple interests that determines institutional change. In the process, he explains how congressional institutions have proved remarkably adaptable and yet consistently frustrating for members and outside observers alike. Analyzing leadership, committee, and procedural restructuring in four periods (1890-1910, 1919-1932, 1937-1952, and 1970-1989), Schickler argues that coalitions promoting a wide range of member interests drive change in both the House and Senate. He shows that multiple interests determine institutional innovation within a period; that different interests are important in different periods; and, more broadly, that changes in the salient collective interests across time do not follow a simple logical or developmental sequence. Institutional development appears disjointed, as new arrangements are layered on preexisting structures intended to serve competing interests. An epilogue assesses the rise and fall of Newt Gingrich in light of these findings. Schickler's model of "disjointed pluralism" integrates rational choice theory with historical institutionalist approaches. It both complicates and advances efforts at theoretical synthesis by proposing a fuller, more nuanced understanding of institutional innovation--and thus of American political development and history.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jul 2021)
650 0 _aLegislators
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
650 0 _aOrganizational change
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / Legislative Branch.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400824250
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400824250
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400824250.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c205377
_d205377