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008 190708s2009 nju fo d z eng d
020 _a9780691114668
_qprint
020 _a9781400826087
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400826087
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400826087
035 _a(DE-B1597)446377
035 _a(OCoLC)979685517
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aB430.R48 2004
072 7 _aPHI026000
_2bisacsh
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aLear, Gabriel Richardson
_eautore
245 1 0 _aHappy Lives and the Highest Good :
_bAn Essay on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics /
_cGabriel Richardson Lear.
250 _aCourse Book
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2009]
264 4 _c©2004
300 _a1 online resource
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _t Frontmatter --
_tContents --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tChapter One. Introduction --
_tChapter Two. The Finality Criterion --
_tChapter Three. The Self-Sufficiency Of Happiness --
_tChapter Four. Acting For The Sake Of An Object Of Love --
_tChapter Five. Theoretical And Practical Reason --
_tChapter Six. Moral Virtue And To Kalon --
_tChapter Seven. Courage, Temperance, And Greatness Of Soul --
_tChapter Eight. Two Happy Lives And Their Most Final Ends --
_tAppendix. Acting For Love In The Symposium --
_tWorks Cited --
_tIndex Locorum --
_tGeneral Index
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aGabriel Richardson Lear presents a bold new approach to one of the enduring debates about Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: the controversy about whether it coherently argues that the best life for humans is one devoted to a single activity, namely philosophical contemplation. Many scholars oppose this reading because the bulk of the Ethics is devoted to various moral virtues--courage and generosity, for example--that are not in any obvious way either manifestations of philosophical contemplation or subordinated to it. They argue that Aristotle was inconsistent, and that we should not try to read the entire Ethics as an attempt to flesh out the notion that the best life aims at the "monistic good" of contemplation. In defending the unity and coherence of the Ethics, Lear argues that, in Aristotle's view, we may act for the sake of an end not just by instrumentally bringing it about but also by approximating it. She then argues that, for Aristotle, the excellent rational activity of moral virtue is an approximation of theoretical contemplation. Thus, the happiest person chooses moral virtue as an approximation of contemplation in practical life. Richardson Lear bolsters this interpretation by examining three moral virtues--courage, temperance, and greatness of soul--and the way they are fine. Elegantly written and rigorously argued, this is a major contribution to our understanding of a central issue in Aristotle's moral philosophy.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 08. Jul 2019)
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / Criticism.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400826087
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400826087.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c205527
_d205527