000			04314nam a22005055i 4500
001			205704
003			IT-RoAPU
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007			cr || ||||||||
008			210830t20092007nju fo d z eng d
020			_a9780691143200 _qprint
020			_a9781400828159 _qPDF
024	7		_a10.1515/9781400828159 _2doi
035			_a(DE-B1597)9781400828159
035			_a(DE-B1597)446674
035			_a(OCoLC)979910720
040			_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda
050		4	_aKF4575.T875 2008
072		7	_aPOL019000 _2bisacsh
084			_aonline - DeGruyter
100	1		_aTushnet, Mark _eautore
245	1	0	_aWeak Courts, Strong Rights : _bJudicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law / _cMark Tushnet.
250			_aCourse Book
264		1	_aPrinceton, NJ : _bPrinceton University Press, _c[2009]
264		4	_c©2007
300			_a1 online resource (312 p.)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tContents -- _tPreface -- _tAcknowledgments -- _tPart I: Strong-Form and Weak-Form Judicial Review -- _tChapter 1. Why Comparative Constitutional Law? -- _tChapter 2. Alternative Forms of Judicial Review -- _tChapter 3. The Possible Instability of Weak-Form Review and Its Implications -- _tPart II: Legislative Responsibility for Enforcing the Constitution -- _tChapter 4. Why and How to Evaluate Constitutional Performance -- _tChapter 5. Constitutional Decision Making Outside the Courts -- _tPart III: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights -- _tChapter 6. The State Action Doctrine and Social and Economic Rights -- _tChapter 7. Structures of Judicial Review, Horizontal Effect, and Social Welfare Rights -- _tChapter 8. Enforcing Social and Economic Rights -- _tTable of Cases -- _tIndex
506	0		_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star
520			_aUnlike many other countries, the United States has few constitutional guarantees of social welfare rights such as income, housing, or healthcare. In part this is because many Americans believe that the courts cannot possibly enforce such guarantees. However, recent innovations in constitutional design in other countries suggest that such rights can be judicially enforced--not by increasing the power of the courts but by decreasing it. In Weak Courts, Strong Rights, Mark Tushnet uses a comparative legal perspective to show how creating weaker forms of judicial review may actually allow for stronger social welfare rights under American constitutional law. Under "strong-form" judicial review, as in the United States, judicial interpretations of the constitution are binding on other branches of government. In contrast, "weak-form" review allows the legislature and executive to reject constitutional rulings by the judiciary--as long as they do so publicly. Tushnet describes how weak-form review works in Great Britain and Canada and discusses the extent to which legislatures can be expected to enforce constitutional norms on their own. With that background, he turns to social welfare rights, explaining the connection between the "state action" or "horizontal effect" doctrine and the enforcement of social welfare rights. Tushnet then draws together the analysis of weak-form review and that of social welfare rights, explaining how weak-form review could be used to enforce those rights. He demonstrates that there is a clear judicial path--not an insurmountable judicial hurdle--to better enforcement of constitutional social welfare rights.
530			_aIssued also in print.
538			_aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650		7	_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Public Policy / Social Services & Welfare. _2bisacsh
850			_aIT-RoAPU
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400828159
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400828159
856	4	2	_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400828159.jpg
942			_cEB
999			_c205704 _d205704