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020 _a9781400829156
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400829156
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400829156
035 _a(DE-B1597)572628
035 _a(OCoLC)1280943720
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
072 7 _aBUS021000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a519.3
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
245 0 0 _aClassics in Game Theory /
_ced. by Harold William Kuhn.
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2020]
264 4 _c©1997
300 _a1 online resource (328 p.) :
_b25 line illus. 30 tables
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aFrontiers of Economic Research
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tCONTENTS --
_tPermissions --
_tForeword --
_tContributor --
_tAn Appreciation --
_tContributor --
_t1. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950) 48-49. --
_t2. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (1950) 155-162. --
_t3. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286-295. --
_t4. An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 296-301. --
_t5. Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form. RAND Memo RM-759 (1952). --
_t6. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 193-216. --
_t7. A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 307-317. --
_t8. Stochastic Games. PNAS 39 (1953) 1095-1100. --
_t9. Recursive Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III (1957) 47-78. --
_t10. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. Bulletin AMS 66 (1960) 173-179. --
_t11. A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic Review 4 (1963) 235-246. --
_t12. The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Advances in Game Theory (1964) 443-477. --
_t13. Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 34 (1966) 1-17. --
_t14. The Core of an ^-Person Game. Econometrica 35 (1967) 50-69. --
_t15. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. --
_t16. The Big Match. Ann. Math. Stat. 39 (1968) 159-163. --
_t17. On Market Games. IE. T. 1 (1969) 9-25. --
_t18. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Th. 4 (1975) 25-55. --
_tList of Contributors --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aClassics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume.Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensive games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as it exists today. Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory and for a broad group of students of economics, political science, and biology.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Nov 2021)
650 7 _aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Econometrics.
_2bisacsh
653 _aBayes-equivalence.
653 _aBorel-measurable function.
653 _aHarsanyi, John C.
653 _aMorgenstern.
653 _aNash equilibrium point.
653 _aWalras law.
653 _aabsence of coalitions.
653 _aattribute vector.
653 _abehavioral strategies.
653 _acombinatorial problem.
653 _acommodity-wise saturation.
653 _acomplete information.
653 _acore.
653 _acritical vector.
653 _adecomposable game.
653 _adirect market.
653 _aequilibrium point.
653 _aexchange economy.
653 _agame tree.
653 _ahomeomorphic mapping.
653 _aindividually rational.
653 _ajoint probability, objective.
653 _alocal strategies.
653 _aminimax condition.
653 _anumerical probability.
653 _aoptimal strategies.
653 _apayoff vector.
653 _apermissible coalition.
653 _aprior-lottery model.
653 _apure strategies.
653 _arandom-vector model.
653 _astable outcome.
653 _asupinf condition.
653 _atransferable utility.
653 _atwo-person games.
653 _autility function.
653 _avector system.
700 1 _aAumann, R.
_eautore
700 1 _aAumann, Robert
_eautore
700 1 _aBlackwell, David
_eautore
700 1 _aDebreu, Gerard
_eautore
700 1 _aEverett, H.
_eautore
700 1 _aFerguson, T.
_eautore
700 1 _aHarsanyi, John
_eautore
700 1 _aKreps, David
_eautore
700 1 _aKuhn, H.
_eautore
700 1 _aKuhn, Harold William
_ecuratore
700 1 _aMaschler, Michael
_eautore
700 1 _aNash, John
_eautore
700 1 _aPeleg, B.
_eautore
700 1 _aRobinson, Julia
_eautore
700 1 _aRubinstein, Ariel
_eautore
700 1 _aScarf, Herbert
_eautore
700 1 _aSelten, R.
_eautore
700 1 _aShapley, L.
_eautore
700 1 _aShapley, Lloyd
_eautore
700 1 _aShubik, Martin
_eautore
700 1 _aThompson, F.
_eautore
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829156?locatt=mode:legacy
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400829156
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781400829156/original
942 _cEB
999 _c205770
_d205770