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008 210830t20092002nju fo d z eng d
020 _a9780691091839
_qprint
020 _a9781400829453
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400829453
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400829453
035 _a(DE-B1597)514634
035 _a(OCoLC)1058492447
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aHB171 -- L22 2002eb
072 7 _aBUS069000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a338.9
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aLaffont, Jean-Jacques
_eautore
245 1 4 _aThe Theory of Incentives :
_bThe Principal-Agent Model /
_cJean-Jacques Laffont, David Martimort.
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2009]
264 4 _c©2002
300 _a1 online resource (440 p.) :
_b70 line illus.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tForeword --
_tIntroduction --
_t1. Incentives in Economic Thought --
_t2. The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off --
_t3. Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection --
_t4. Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs --
_t5. Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard --
_t6. Nonverifiability --
_t7. Mixed Models --
_t8. Dynamics under Full Commitment --
_t9. Limits and Extensions --
_tReferences --
_tAuthor Index --
_tSubject Index
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aEconomics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aEconomics.
650 0 _aIncentives in industry.
650 7 _aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General.
_2bisacsh
700 1 _aMartimort, David
_eautore
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829453?locatt=mode:legacy
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400829453
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400829453.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c205791
_d205791