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001 205841
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008 210830t20092002nju fo d z eng d
020 _a9780691016672
_qprint
020 _a9781400830138
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400830138
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400830138
035 _a(DE-B1597)446475
035 _a(OCoLC)979685619
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aHF5476.K27 2002
072 7 _aBUS036000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a381.17
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aKagel, John H.
_eautore
245 1 0 _aCommon Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse /
_cDan Levin, John H. Kagel.
250 _aCourse Book
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2009]
264 4 _c©2002
300 _a1 online resource (424 p.) :
_b79 tables. 27 line illus.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tPreface --
_tCredits --
_t1 Bidding in Common-Value Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research --
_t2 First-Price Common-Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the "Winner's Curse" --
_t3 The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions --
_t4 Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common Value Auctions --
_t5 Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study --
_t6 Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions --
_t7 Common Value Auctions with Insider Information --
_t8 Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions? --
_t9 Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation --
_t10 Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial Observations --
_t11 Cross-Game Learning: Experimental Evidence from First-Price and English Common Value Auctions --
_t12 A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis --
_t13 Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the Commercial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winner's Curse --
_tInstructions --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aFew forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aAuctions.
650 0 _aParadoxes.
650 0 _aValue.
650 7 _aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Investments & Securities / General.
_2bisacsh
700 1 _aAvery, Christopher
_eautore
700 1 _aBattalio, Raymond C.
_eautore
700 1 _aCampbell, Colin M.
_eautore
700 1 _aDyer, Douglas
_eautore
700 1 _aGarvin, Susan
_eautore
700 1 _aHarstad, Ronald M.
_eautore
700 1 _aKagel, John H.
_eautore
700 1 _aLevin, Dan
_eautore
700 1 _aMeyer, Donald J.
_eautore
700 1 _aRichard, Jean-Francois
_eautore
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830138
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400830138
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400830138.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c205841
_d205841