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008 190708s2009 nju fo d z eng d
020 _a9780691135311
_qprint
020 _a9781400830909
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400830909
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400830909
035 _a(DE-B1597)446930
035 _a(OCoLC)979745137
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
072 7 _aPHI013000
_2bisacsh
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aHare, Caspar
_eautore
245 1 0 _aOn Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects /
_cCaspar Hare.
250 _aCourse Book
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2009]
264 4 _c©2009
300 _a1 online resource :
_b24 line illus.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _t Frontmatter --
_tContents --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tIntroduction --
_t1 Self- Interest and Self- Importance --
_t2 Time- Bias and the Metaphysics of Time --
_t3 Egocentrism and Egocentric Metaphysics --
_t4 Clarifications --
_t5 A Problem about Personal Identity over Time --
_t6 The Solution --
_t7 Skepticism and Humility --
_tNotes --
_tReferences --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aCaspar Hare makes an original and compelling case for "egocentric presentism," a view about the nature of first-person experience, about what happens when we see things from our own particular point of view. A natural thought about our first-person experience is that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present to me." Hare, however, goes one step further and claims, counterintuitively, that the thought should instead be that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present." There is, in other words, something unique about me and the things of which I am aware. On Myself and Other, Less Important Subjects represents a new take on an old view, known as solipsism, which maintains that people's experiences give them grounds for believing that they have a special, distinguished place in the world--for example, believing that only they exist or that other people do not have conscious minds like their own. Few contemporary thinkers have taken solipsism seriously. But Hare maintains that the version of solipsism he argues for is in indeed defensible, and that it is uniquely capable of resolving some seemingly intractable philosophical problems--both in metaphysics and ethics--concerning personal identity over time, as well as the tension between self-interest and the greater good. This formidable and tightly argued defense of a seemingly absurd view is certain to provoke debate.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 08. Jul 2019)
650 0 _aSelf (Philosophy).
650 0 _aSolipsism.
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / Metaphysics.
_2bisacsh
700 1 _aJohnston, Mark
_eautore
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830909
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400830909.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c205895
_d205895