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001 206189
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008 210830t20102010nju fo d z eng d
020 _a9780691139159
_qprint
020 _a9781400835270
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400835270
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400835270
035 _a(DE-B1597)446858
035 _a(OCoLC)979968497
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aHJ192.5
_b.K63 2010eb
072 7 _aBUS051000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a336.001/5195
_222
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aKocherlakota, Narayana R.
_eautore
245 1 4 _aThe New Dynamic Public Finance /
_cNarayana R. Kocherlakota.
250 _aCourse Book
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2010]
264 4 _c©2010
300 _a1 online resource (200 p.) :
_b15 line illus.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aThe Toulouse Lectures in Economics
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tPreface --
_t1. Introduction --
_t2. The Ramsey Approach and Its Problems --
_t3. Basics of Dynamic Social Contracting --
_t4. Dynamic Optimal Taxation: Lessons for Macroeconomists --
_t5. Optimal Intergenerational Taxation --
_t6. Quantitative Analysis: Methods and Results --
_t7. The Way Forward --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aOptimal tax design attempts to resolve a well-known trade-off: namely, that high taxes are bad insofar as they discourage people from working, but good to the degree that, by redistributing wealth, they help insure people against productivity shocks. Until recently, however, economic research on this question either ignored people's uncertainty about their future productivities or imposed strong and unrealistic functional form restrictions on taxes. In response to these problems, the new dynamic public finance was developed to study the design of optimal taxes given only minimal restrictions on the set of possible tax instruments, and on the nature of shocks affecting people in the economy. In this book, Narayana Kocherlakota surveys and discusses this exciting new approach to public finance. An important book for advanced PhD courses in public finance and macroeconomics, The New Dynamic Public Finance provides a formal connection between the problem of dynamic optimal taxation and dynamic principal-agent contracting theory. This connection means that the properties of solutions to principal-agent problems can be used to determine the properties of optimal tax systems. The book shows that such optimal tax systems necessarily involve asset income taxes, which may depend in sophisticated ways on current and past labor incomes. It also addresses the implications of this new approach for qualitative properties of optimal monetary policy, optimal government debt policy, and optimal bequest taxes. In addition, the book describes computational methods for approximate calculation of optimal taxes, and discusses possible paths for future research.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aFinance, Public
_xMathematical models.
650 0 _aFiscal policy
_xMathematical models.
650 0 _aTaxation
_xMathematical models.
650 7 _aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Public Finance.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400835270
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400835270
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400835270.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c206189
_d206189