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008 210830t20102005nju fo d z eng d
020 _a9780691133812
_qprint
020 _a9781400837014
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400837014
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400837014
035 _a(DE-B1597)446360
035 _a(OCoLC)979593510
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aHD2741 -- G677 2005eb
072 7 _aBUS079000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a338.6
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aGourevitch, Peter A.
_eautore
245 1 0 _aPolitical Power and Corporate Control :
_bThe New Global Politics of Corporate Governance /
_cJames Shinn, Peter A. Gourevitch.
250 _aCourse Book
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2010]
264 4 _c©2005
300 _a1 online resource (368 p.) :
_b23 line illus. 53 tables.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tCONTENTS --
_tLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS --
_tPREFACE --
_tCHAPTER ONE. Introduction and Summary Argument --
_tCHAPTER TWO. Governance Patterns: What Causes What? --
_tCHAPTER THREE. Framing Incentives: The Economics and Law Tradition --
_tCHAPTER FOUR. Politics: Preferences and Institutions --
_tCHAPTER FIVE. Preference Cleavages 1: Class Conflict --
_tCHAPTER SIX. Preference Cleavages 2: Sectoral Conflict --
_tCHAPTER SEVEN. Preference Cleavages 3: Transparency, Voice, and Pensions --
_tCHAPTER EIGHT. Conclusion: Going Forward --
_tData Appendix --
_tBIBLIOGRAPHY --
_tINDEX
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aWhy does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 7 _aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Government & Business.
_2bisacsh
700 1 _aShinn, James
_eautore
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400837014
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400837014
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400837014.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c206298
_d206298