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008			210830t20112005nju fo d z eng d
020			_a9780691133744 _qprint
020			_a9781400841264 _qPDF
024	7		_a10.1515/9781400841264 _2doi
035			_a(DE-B1597)9781400841264
035			_a(DE-B1597)453609
035			_a(OCoLC)979968556
040			_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda
050		4	_aK290 .B37 2011
072		7	_aLAW052000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a340 _a340.1 _a340/.1
084			_aonline - DeGruyter
100	1		_aBarak, Aharon _eautore
245	1	0	_aPurposive Interpretation in Law / _cAharon Barak.
250			_aCourse Book
264		1	_aPrinceton, NJ : _bPrinceton University Press, _c[2011]
264		4	_c©2005
300			_a1 online resource (448 p.) : _b2 line illus. 1 table.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tContents -- _tIntroduction -- _tPart One. Interpretation -- _tChapter One. What Is Legal Interpretation? -- _tChapter Two. Non-Interpretive Doctrines -- _tPart Two. Purposive Interpretation -- _tChapter Three. The Essence of Purposive Interpretation -- _tChapter Four. The Semantic Component of Purposive Interpretation -- _tChapter Five. The Purposive Component of Purposive Interpretation -- _tChapter Six. Subjective Purpose: Authorial Intent -- _tChapter Seven. Objective Purpose: Intent of the Reasonable Author; Intent of the System -- _tChapter Eight. The Purposive Component: Ultimate Purpose -- _tChapter Nine. Discretion as a Component in Purposive Interpretation -- _tChapter Ten. The Theoretical Basis for Purposive Interpretation -- _tChapter Eleven. Purposive Interpretation and Its Critique of Other Systems of Interpretation -- _tPart Three. Interpretation in Law -- _tChapter Twelve. The Interpretation of Wills -- _tChapter Thirteen. The Interpretation of Contracts -- _tChapter Fourteen. Statutory Interpretation -- _tChapter Fifteen. Constitutional Interpretation -- _tAppendix 1. The Structure of Legal Interpretation -- _tAppendix 2. Purposive Interpretation -- _tAppendix 3. Weighting Subjective and Objective Purposes -- _tIndex
506	0		_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star
520			_aThis book presents a comprehensive theory of legal interpretation, by a leading judge and legal theorist. Currently, legal philosophers and jurists apply different theories of interpretation to constitutions, statutes, rules, wills, and contracts. Aharon Barak argues that an alternative approach--purposive interpretation--allows jurists and scholars to approach all legal texts in a similar manner while remaining sensitive to the important differences. Moreover, regardless of whether purposive interpretation amounts to a unifying theory, it would still be superior to other methods of interpretation in tackling each kind of text separately. Barak explains purposive interpretation as follows: All legal interpretation must start by establishing a range of semantic meanings for a given text, from which the legal meaning is then drawn. In purposive interpretation, the text's "purpose" is the criterion for establishing which of the semantic meanings yields the legal meaning. Establishing the ultimate purpose--and thus the legal meaning--depends on the relationship between the subjective and objective purposes; that is, between the original intent of the text's author and the intent of a reasonable author and of the legal system at the time of interpretation. This is easy to establish when the subjective and objective purposes coincide. But when they don't, the relative weight given to each purpose depends on the nature of the text. For example, subjective purpose is given substantial weight in interpreting a will; objective purpose, in interpreting a constitution. Barak develops this theory with masterful scholarship and close attention to its practical application. Throughout, he contrasts his approach with that of textualists and neotextualists such as Antonin Scalia, pragmatists such as Richard Posner, and legal philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin. This book represents a profoundly important contribution to legal scholarship and a major alternative to interpretive approaches advanced by other leading figures in the judicial world.
530			_aIssued also in print.
538			_aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650		0	_aLaw _xInterpretation and construction.
650		0	_aLaw _xPhilosophy.
650		0	_aSemantics (Law).
650		7	_aLAW / Jurisprudence. _2bisacsh
700	1		_aBashi, Sari _eautore
850			_aIT-RoAPU
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400841264
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400841264
856	4	2	_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400841264.jpg
942			_cEB
999			_c206554 _d206554