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020 _a9780691134697
_qprint
020 _a9781400842926
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400842926
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400842926
035 _a(DE-B1597)447250
035 _a(OCoLC)979629534
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aHG3891.5
_b.T66 2007
072 7 _aPOL011000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a336.3/43509
_222
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aTomz, Michael
_eautore
245 1 0 _aReputation and International Cooperation :
_bSovereign Debt across Three Centuries /
_cMichael Tomz.
250 _aCourse Book
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2012]
264 4 _c©2008
300 _a1 online resource (328 p.) :
_b16 line illus. 27 tables.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tTables --
_tFigures --
_tPreface --
_tPART ONE: THEORY --
_tChapter 1. The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt --
_tChapter 2. A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation --
_tPART TWO: EVIDENCE --
_tChapter 3. Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers --
_tChapter 4. Reputation in Expert Opinion --
_tChapter 5. Reputations during Good Times and Bad --
_tChapter 6. Enforcement by Gunboats --
_tChapter 7. Enforcement through Trade Sanctions --
_tChapter 8. Enforcement through Collective Retaliation --
_tPART THREE: IMPLICATIONS --
_tChapter 9. Reputation and Cooperation under Anarchy --
_tBibliography --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aHow does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible. Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt. His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jul 2021)
650 0 _aDebtor and creditor
_xHistory.
650 0 _aDebts, External
_xHistory.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400842926
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400842926
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400842926.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c206647
_d206647