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020 _a9780691089454
_qprint
020 _a9781400842971
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400842971
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400842971
035 _a(DE-B1597)453626
035 _a(OCoLC)979905297
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aBD438.5 -- M67 2001eb
072 7 _aPHI004000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a126
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aMoran, Richard
_eautore
245 1 0 _aAuthority and Estrangement :
_bAn Essay on Self-Knowledge /
_cRichard Moran.
250 _aCore Textbook
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2012]
264 4 _c©2002
300 _a1 online resource (240 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tOutline of the Chapters --
_tPreface --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tCHAPTER ONE. The Image of Self- Knowledge --
_tCHAPTER TWO. Making Up Your Mind: Self-Interpretationand Self-Constitution --
_tCHAPTER THREE Self-Knowledge as Discovery and as Resolution --
_tCHAPTER FOUR. The Authority of Self-Consciousness --
_tCHAPTER FIVE Impersonality, Expression, and the Undoing of Self-Knowledge --
_tBibliography --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aSince Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today the idea of ''first-person authority''--the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life--has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive relation to his or her own mental life, let alone a privileged one. In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran argues for a reconception of the first-person and its claims. Indeed, he writes, a more thorough repudiation of the idea of privileged inner observation leads to a deeper appreciation of the systematic differences between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others, differences that are both irreducible and constitutive of the very concept and life of the person. Masterfully blending philosophy of mind and moral psychology, Moran develops a view of self-knowledge that concentrates on the self as agent rather than spectator. He argues that while each person does speak for his own thought and feeling with a distinctive authority, that very authority is tied just as much to the disprivileging of the first-person, to its specific possibilities of alienation. Drawing on certain themes from Wittgenstein, Sartre, and others, the book explores the extent to which what we say about ourselves is a matter of discovery or of creation, the difficulties and limitations in being ''objective'' toward ourselves, and the conflicting demands of realism about oneself and responsibility for oneself. What emerges is a strikingly original and psychologically nuanced exploration of the contrasting ideals of relations to oneself and relations to others.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jul 2021)
650 0 _aSelf-knowledge, Theory of.
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / Epistemology.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400842971
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400842971
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400842971.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c206651
_d206651