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019 _a(OCoLC)979755323
020 _a9780691158624
_qprint
020 _a9781400846078
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400846078
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400846078
035 _a(DE-B1597)453895
035 _a(OCoLC)847526806
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aHD41
_b.K37 2017
072 7 _aBUS069000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a338.6048
_223
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aKaplow, Louis
_eautore
245 1 0 _aCompetition Policy and Price Fixing /
_cLouis Kaplow.
250 _aCourse Book
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2013]
264 4 _c©2013
300 _a1 online resource (512 p.) :
_b25 line illus.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tSummary of Contents --
_tPreface --
_t1. Introduction --
_tPart I: Horizontal Agreements --
_t2. Defining the Problem --
_t3. Communications --
_t4. Statutory Provisions and Higher Court Interpretations --
_t5. U.S. Lower Court Practice --
_t6. Paradox of Proof --
_t7. Oligopoly Theory and the Agreement Requirement --
_tPart II: Price-Fixing Policy --
_t8. Social Welfare --
_t9. Framework for Decision-Making --
_t10. Detection: Market-Based Evidence --
_t11. Detection: Other Types of Evidence --
_t12. Liability Assessment --
_t13. Sanctions --
_t14. Unilateral Market Power --
_t15. Additional Considerations --
_tPart III: Comparison of Approaches --
_t16. Communications-Based Prohibition --
_t17. Detection of Prohibited Communications --
_t18. Further Topics --
_t19. Conclusion --
_tReferences --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aThroughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition Policy and Price Fixing provides the needed analytical foundation. It offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. In doing so, Louis Kaplow elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, Kaplow shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, he explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior--and is also easier to apply.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aAntitrust law.
650 0 _aCompetition
_xGovernment policy.
650 0 _aDroit de la concurrence.
650 0 _aFixation des prix.
650 0 _aIntégration horizontale.
650 0 _aPolitique des prix.
650 0 _aPreisabsprache.
650 0 _aPreisregelung.
650 0 _aPrice fixing.
650 0 _aWettbewerbsordnung.
650 0 _aWettbewerbspolitik.
650 0 _aWettbewerbsrecht.
650 7 _aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General.
_2bisacsh
653 _aEU Article 101.
653 _aEuropean Union.
653 _aSherman Act Section 1.
653 _aSupreme Court precedents.
653 _aU.S. antitrust law.
653 _aU.S. lower court.
653 _aadjudication.
653 _aagreement requirement.
653 _aalternative rule.
653 _aburden of proof.
653 _acheating.
653 _achilling effects.
653 _acircumstantial evidence.
653 _aclassic cartels.
653 _acommunication-based prohibition.
653 _acommunications technology.
653 _acommunications-based prohibition.
653 _acommunications.
653 _acompetition law.
653 _acompetition policy.
653 _acompetition rules.
653 _aconsumer welfare.
653 _acontrasting approaches.
653 _aconventional prohibition.
653 _acoordinated behavior.
653 _acoordinated oligopoly pricing.
653 _acoordinated price elevation.
653 _acorporate strategy.
653 _adecision-making framework.
653 _adecision-theoretic approach.
653 _adetection.
653 _adeterrence benefits.
653 _adeterrence.
653 _adifferentiated products.
653 _adifferentiation.
653 _adirect approach.
653 _agame theory.
653 _ahomogeneous goods.
653 _ahorizontal agreements.
653 _ahorizontal-restraints cases.
653 _aindirect approach.
653 _aindustry conditions.
653 _ainjunctions.
653 _ainstitutional issues.
653 _ainterdependence.
653 _ainterdependent coordination.
653 _ainterfirm communication.
653 _ainterfirm communications.
653 _ainternal evidence.
653 _ainvestigation.
653 _alanguage.
653 _aliability assessment.
653 _aliability.
653 _alower courts.
653 _amarket behavior.
653 _amarket conditions.
653 _amarket-based evidence.
653 _amarket-based techniques.
653 _amodern competition policy.
653 _amodern oligopoly theory.
653 _amonetary sanctions.
653 _anegative behavioral effects.
653 _anonprice coordination.
653 _anonprice terms.
653 _aoligopolies.
653 _aoligopolistic coordination.
653 _aoligopolistic industries.
653 _aoligopolistic price elevation.
653 _aoligopoly behavior.
653 _aoligopoly theory.
653 _aorthodox prohibition.
653 _aparadox of proof.
653 _apolar-opposite cases.
653 _aprice coordination.
653 _aprice cutting.
653 _aprice elevation.
653 _aprice fixing.
653 _aprice-fixing cases.
653 _aprice-fixing prohibition.
653 _aprior scholarship.
653 _apure interdependence.
653 _aremedies.
653 _asanctions.
653 _asocial welfare consequences.
653 _asocial welfare.
653 _aunilateral market power.
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400846078?locatt=mode:legacy
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400846078
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400846078.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c206836
_d206836