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008 210830t20151976nju fo d z eng d
020 _a9780691617541
_qprint
020 _a9781400867905
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781400867905
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781400867905
035 _a(DE-B1597)454141
035 _a(OCoLC)979742917
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aDP269.47.I8
072 7 _aHIS045000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a946.081
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aCoverdale, John F.
_eautore
245 1 0 _aItalian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War /
_cJohn F. Coverdale.
264 1 _aPrinceton, NJ :
_bPrinceton University Press,
_c[2015]
264 4 _c©1976
300 _a1 online resource (480 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aPrinceton Legacy Library ;
_v1285
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tTABLE OF CONTENTS --
_tLIST OF TABLES --
_tLIST OF MAPS --
_tPREFACE --
_tACKNOWLEDGMENTS --
_tABBREVIATIONS --
_tPART I --
_tONE. THE BACKGROUND OF INTERVENTION: ITALY IN 1936 --
_tTWO. THE BACKGROUND OF INTERVENTION: ITALO-SPANISH RELATIONS 1922-1936 --
_tTHREE. THE DECISION TO SUPPORT FRANCO: JULY 1936 --
_tFOUR. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CONFLICT: AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1936 --
_tFIVE "CONTE ROSSI" IN MAJORCA --
_tPART II --
_tSIX. AN ITALIAN ARMY IN SPAIN: DECEMBER 1936-MARCH 1937 --
_tSEVEN. ITALIAN TROOPS IN ACTION: MALAGA AND GUADALAJARA --
_tPART III --
_tEIGHT. INTERNATIONAL TENSION: MARCHSEPTEMBER 1937 --
_tNINE.TO THE BITTER END: OCTOBER 1937-APRIL1939 --
_tTEN. EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSIONS --
_tAPPENDICES --
_tA NOTE ON SOURCES --
_tINDEX --
_tBackmatter
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aUsing hitherto unavailable material from the Italian foreign ministry, Franco's headquarters, and Mussolini's secretariat, John F. Coverdale traces the development of Italo-Spanish relations from the beginning of the Fascist regime. His analysis reveals that traditional foreign policy outweighed ideological and internal political considerations in Mussolini's decision making. John F. Coverdale finds that while Italy's support was essential to Franco's victory, Rome exercised very little influence on his decisions. The author concludes that participation in the Spanish Civil War was less important than is generally believed in determining Italy's entrance into World War II on Hitler's side, and that it did not significantly weaken her armed forces.Originally published in 1976.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 7 _aHISTORY / Europe / Spain & Portugal.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781400867905
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400867905
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400867905.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c208502
_d208502