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020 _a9781474417846
_qprint
020 _a9781474417853
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781474417853
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781474417853
035 _a(DE-B1597)616038
035 _a(OCoLC)1306541736
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
072 7 _aPHI004000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a121/.34092
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aShrock, Christopher A.
_eautore
245 1 0 _aThomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities /
_cChristopher A. Shrock.
264 1 _aEdinburgh :
_bEdinburgh University Press,
_c[2022]
264 4 _c©2017
300 _a1 online resource (192 p.) :
_b2 B/W illustrations 2 B/W tables
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aEdinburgh Studies in Scottish Philosophy : ESSP
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tAcknowledgements --
_tSeries Editor’s Preface --
_tPART I Why Secondary Qualities are a Problem --
_tIntroduction --
_t1 Why Direct Realism? --
_t2 General Exposition of the Problem of Secondary Qualities --
_t3 Why Direct Realism Needs Objective Secondary Qualities --
_tPART II How Thomas Reid Solves the Problem --
_tIntroduction --
_t4 Primary and Secondary Qualities in Reid’s Theory of Perception --
_t5 Answering the Problem of Secondary Qualities --
_t6 Understanding Reid’s Distinction --
_tPART III Objections to Reid’s Theory of Secondary Qualities and Replies --
_tIntroduction --
_t7 Scientific Objections --
_t8 A Priori Objections --
_t9 A Historical Objection --
_t10 Conclusion --
_tBibliography --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aDefends Reid's Common Sense philosophy against the claim that perception does not allow us to experience the physical worldWith a new reading of Thomas Reid on primary and secondary qualities, Christopher A. Shrock illuminates the Common Sense theory of perception. Shrock follow's Reid's lead in defending common sense philosophy against the problem of secondary qualities, which claims that our perceptions are only experiences in our brains, and don't let us know about the world around us. At the same time, Schrock maintains a healthy optimism about science and reason.Common sense philosophy states that we connect with the physical world around us through our perception of it. Philosophers call this view of perception 'direct realism'. The opposite view to this is 'the problem of secondary qualities', which relegates our perceptions – from colours, smells, sounds and tastes to how long something looks or how heavy something feels – to the mental realm, because science has no objective place for them. The logical conclusion of this argument is that we can never perceive physical objects or their properties through our senses.Key FeaturesGives a new and convincing interpretation of Reid on primary and secondary qualitiesFormalises the problem of secondary qualities, the most important objection facing direct realism todayEngages with a historically wide range of thinkers, from early moderns to the presentProposes an innovative philosophy of colour, where colours are objective, visible properties of mind-external entities"
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jun 2022)
650 0 _aKnowledge, Theory of.
650 0 _aPerception (Philosophy).
650 4 _aPhilosophy.
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / Epistemology.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781474417853?locatt=mode:legacy
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781474417853
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781474417853/original
942 _cEB
999 _c216683
_d216683