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001			221376
003			IT-RoAPU
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008			240426t20162016nyu fo d z eng d
020			_a9781501703836 _qPDF
024	7		_a10.7591/9781501703836 _2doi
035			_a(DE-B1597)9781501703836
035			_a(DE-B1597)496417
035			_a(OCoLC)953459122
040			_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda
072		7	_aPOL011000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a327.1/17 _223/eng
084			_aonline - DeGruyter
100	1		_aLake, David A. _eautore
245	1	4	_aThe Statebuilder's Dilemma : _bOn the Limits of Foreign Intervention / _cDavid A. Lake.
264		1	_aIthaca, NY : _bCornell University Press, _c[2016]
264		4	_c©2016
300			_a1 online resource (256 p.) : _b4 line figures, 2 charts
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tContents -- _tPreface -- _tIntroduction -- _t1. Building Legitimate States -- _t2. Problems of Sovereignty -- _t3. Legitimacy and Loyalty -- _t4. Statebuilding in Iraq -- _t5. Statebuilding in Somalia -- _tConclusion -- _tReferences -- _tAcknowledgments -- _tIndex
506	0		_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star
520			_aThe central task of all statebuilding is to create a state that is regarded as legitimate by the people over whom it exercises authority. This is a necessary condition for stable, effective governance. States sufficiently motivated to bear the costs of building a state in some distant land are likely to have interests in the future policies of that country, and will therefore seek to promote loyal leaders who are sympathetic to their interests and willing to implement their preferred policies. In The Statebuilder's Dilemma, David A. Lake addresses the key tradeoff between legitimacy and loyalty common to all international statebuilding attempts. Except in rare cases where the policy preferences of the statebuilder and the population of the country whose state is to be built coincide, as in the famous success cases of West Germany and Japan after 1945, promoting a leader who will remain loyal to the statebuilder undermines that leader’s legitimacy at home.In Iraq, thrust into a statebuilding role it neither anticipated nor wanted, the United States eventually backed Nouri al-Malaki as the most favorable of a bad lot of alternative leaders. Malaki then used the support of the Bush administration to govern as a Shiite partisan, undermining the statebuilding effort and ultimately leading to the second failure of the Iraqi state in 2014. Ethiopia faced the same tradeoff in Somalia after the rise of a promising but irredentist government in 2006, invading to put its own puppet in power in Mogadishu. But the resulting government has not been able to build significant local support and legitimacy. Lake uses these cases to demonstrate that the greater the interests of the statebuilder in the target country, the more difficult it is to build a legitimate state that can survive on its own.
538			_aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Apr 2024)
650		4	_aInternational Studies.
650		4	_aPolitical Science & Political History.
650		7	_0(DE-588)4075230-6 _0(DE-627)104306335 _0(DE-576)209197005 _aNationenbildung _2gnd
650		7	_0(DE-588)4124897-1 _0(DE-627)104188782 _0(DE-576)209571985 _aFallstudie _2gnd
650		7	_0(DE-588)4153414-1 _0(DE-627)105531170 _0(DE-576)209803150 _aExterner Effekt _2gnd
650		7	_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General. _2bisacsh
653			_astatebuilding, loyalty, international statebuilding, leader legitimacy, authority, effective governance,.
850			_aIT-RoAPU
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.7591/9781501703836
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501703836
856	4	2	_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501703836/original
942			_cEB
999			_c221376 _d221376