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| 003 | IT-RoAPU | ||
| 005 | 20250106150831.0 | ||
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| 008 | 240426t20182018nyu fo d z eng d | ||
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_a9781501709371 _qPDF |
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| 024 | 7 |
_a10.7591/9781501709371 _2doi |
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| 035 | _a(DE-B1597)9781501709371 | ||
| 035 | _a(DE-B1597)496574 | ||
| 035 | _a(OCoLC)992438021 | ||
| 040 |
_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda |
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| 050 | 4 | _aJZ5665 | |
| 072 | 7 |
_aPOL001000 _2bisacsh |
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| 082 | 0 | 4 |
_a327.1/747 _223 |
| 084 | _aonline - DeGruyter | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aAmbrose, Matthew J. _eautore |
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| 245 | 1 | 4 |
_aThe Control Agenda : _bA History of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks / _cMatthew J. Ambrose. |
| 264 | 1 |
_aIthaca, NY : _bCornell University Press, _c[2018] |
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| 264 | 4 | _c©2018 | |
| 300 | _a1 online resource (282 p.) | ||
| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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| 337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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| 338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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| 347 |
_atext file _bPDF _2rda |
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| 505 | 0 | 0 |
_tFrontmatter -- _tContents -- _tAcknowledgments -- _tINTRODUCTION. THE PROMISE OF CONTROL -- _t1. ARMS CONTROL: CONTEXT AND PRECEDENTS -- _t2. NEGOTIATION: A NEW DIMENSION IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION -- _t3. AFTERMATH AND ADAPTATION: THE ORIGINS OF SALT II -- _t4. “IN GOOD FAITH”: CARTER’S GAMBIT -- _t5. “THINKING OUT LOUD”: THE STRUGGLE WITH SPRAWL -- _t6. “SUMMARY—BLEAK”: THE UNRAVELING OF DETENTE -- _t7. INF: THE LAST GASP OF SALT -- _tCONCLUSION. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONTROL -- _tNOTES -- _tBIBLIOGRAPHY -- _tINDEX |
| 506 | 0 |
_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star |
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| 520 | _aThe Control Agenda is a sweeping account of the history of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), their rise in the Nixon and Ford administrations, their downfall under President Carter, and their powerful legacies in the Reagan years and beyond.Matthew Ambrose pays close attention to the interplay of diplomacy, domestic politics, and technology, and finds that the SALT process was a key point of reference for arguments regarding all forms of Cold War decision making. Ambrose argues elite U.S. decision makers used SALT to better manage their restive domestic populations and to exert greater control over the shape, structure, and direction of their nuclear arsenals.Ambrose also asserts that prolonged engagement with arms control issues introduced dynamic effects into nuclear policy. Arms control considerations came to influence most areas of defense decision making, while the measure of stability SALT provided allowed the examination of new and potentially dangerous nuclear doctrines. The Control Agenda makes clear that verification and compliance concerns by the United States prompted continuous reassessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions; assessments that later undergirded key U.S. policy changes toward the Soviet Union. Through SALT’s many twists and turns, accusations and countercharges, secret backchannels and propaganda campaigns the specter of nuclear conflict loomed large. | ||
| 538 | _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. | ||
| 546 | _aIn English. | ||
| 588 | 0 | _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Apr 2024) | |
| 650 | 0 |
_aNuclear arms control _zSoviet Union _xHistory. |
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| 650 | 0 |
_aNuclear arms control _zUnited States _xHistory. |
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| 650 | 4 | _aInternational Studies. | |
| 650 | 4 | _aPolitical Science & Political History. | |
| 650 | 4 | _aU.S. History. | |
| 650 | 7 |
_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Arms Control. _2bisacsh |
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| 653 | _anuclear, Cold War, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, SALT, INF, arms control. | ||
| 850 | _aIT-RoAPU | ||
| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.7591/9781501709371 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501709371 |
| 856 | 4 | 2 |
_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501709371/original |
| 942 | _cEB | ||
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