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| 001 | 221629 | ||
| 003 | IT-RoAPU | ||
| 005 | 20250106150835.0 | ||
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| 007 | cr || |||||||| | ||
| 008 | 240426t19851985nyu fo d z eng d | ||
| 019 | _a(OCoLC)1054874348 | ||
| 020 |
_a9781501713262 _qPDF |
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| 024 | 7 |
_a10.7591/9781501713262 _2doi |
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| 035 | _a(DE-B1597)9781501713262 | ||
| 035 | _a(DE-B1597)489604 | ||
| 035 | _a(OCoLC)971492838 | ||
| 040 |
_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda |
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| 072 | 7 |
_aPOL012000 _2bisacsh |
|
| 082 | 0 | 4 |
_a355.02/17 _223 |
| 084 | _aonline - DeGruyter | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aMearsheimer, John J. _eautore |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aConventional Deterrence / _cJohn J. Mearsheimer. |
| 264 | 1 |
_aIthaca, NY : _bCornell University Press, _c[1985] |
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| 264 | 4 | _c©1985 | |
| 300 | _a1 online resource (296 p.) | ||
| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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| 337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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| 338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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| 347 |
_atext file _bPDF _2rda |
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| 490 | 0 | _aCornell Studies in Security Affairs | |
| 505 | 0 | 0 |
_tFrontmatter -- _tContents -- _tPreface -- _t1. Introduction -- _t2. Conventional Deterrence -- _t3. The Allied Decision Not to Attack Germany, March 1939-May 1940 -- _t4. The German Decision to Attack in the West, 1939-1940 -- _t5. Conventional Deterrence and the Arab-Israeli Conflict -- _t6. The Prospects for Conventional Deterrence in Central Europe -- _t7. Precision-Guided Munitions and Conventional Deterrence -- _t8. Conclusion -- _tNotes -- _tSelect Bibliography -- _tIndex |
| 506 | 0 |
_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star |
|
| 520 | _aConventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939–1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare.Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive" weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war. | ||
| 538 | _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. | ||
| 546 | _aIn English. | ||
| 588 | 0 | _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Apr 2024) | |
| 650 | 0 |
_aDeterrence (Strategy) _xHistory _y20th century. |
|
| 650 | 0 |
_aMilitary history, Modern _y20th century. |
|
| 650 | 4 | _aInternational Studies. | |
| 650 | 4 | _aPolitical Science & Political History. | |
| 650 | 7 |
_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International). _2bisacsh |
|
| 653 | _aarms control. | ||
| 653 | _abook on arms control. | ||
| 653 | _acauses for war. | ||
| 653 | _acrises that lead to war. | ||
| 653 | _adeterrence and defense. | ||
| 653 | _adeterrence as a strategy. | ||
| 653 | _aexplaining the causes of war. | ||
| 653 | _agame theory. | ||
| 653 | _ahistorical arms control. | ||
| 653 | _ainternational politics theory. | ||
| 653 | _ainternational security. | ||
| 653 | _amilitary deterrence. | ||
| 653 | _amilitary doctrine. | ||
| 653 | _amilitary history. | ||
| 653 | _amilitary science. | ||
| 653 | _amilitary strategies. | ||
| 653 | _amilitary strategy history. | ||
| 653 | _amilitary studies. | ||
| 653 | _amilitary theory. | ||
| 653 | _amodern military history. | ||
| 653 | _apolitical consideration for war. | ||
| 653 | _apolitical theory. | ||
| 653 | _astarting wars. | ||
| 653 | _astrategies of conflict. | ||
| 653 | _astudy of world politics. | ||
| 653 | _astudying the military. | ||
| 653 | _athe causes of war. | ||
| 653 | _atheory of international politics. | ||
| 653 | _awar studies. | ||
| 653 | _awhat are the origns of war. | ||
| 653 | _awhat is conventional deterrence. | ||
| 653 | _awhat is failed deterrence. | ||
| 653 | _awhat starts wars. | ||
| 653 | _awhy deterrence fails. | ||
| 850 | _aIT-RoAPU | ||
| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713262 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501713262 |
| 856 | 4 | 2 |
_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501713262/original |
| 942 | _cEB | ||
| 999 |
_c221629 _d221629 |
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