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001			221670
003			IT-RoAPU
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008			240426t20192019nyu fo d z eng d
020			_a9781501715204 _qPDF
024	7		_a10.1515/9781501715204 _2doi
035			_a(DE-B1597)9781501715204
035			_a(DE-B1597)527410
035			_a(OCoLC)1089271376
040			_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda
050		4	_aDS79.76 _b.L37 2020
072		7	_aHIS027170 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a956.704434 _223
084			_aonline - DeGruyter
245	0	4	_aThe Last Card : _bInside George W. Bush's Decision to Surge in Iraq / _ced. by Hal Brands, Jeffrey A. Engel, Timothy Andrews Sayle, William Inboden.
264		1	_aIthaca, NY : _bCornell University Press, _c[2019]
264		4	_c©2019
300			_a1 online resource (416 p.) : _b4 maps, 2 charts
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tContents -- _tEditorial Note -- _tIntroduction: The American Occupation Of Iraq By 2006 And The Search For A New Strategy Timothy Andrews Sayle And Hal Brands -- _tPart 1 -- _t1. America’S War In Iraq: 2003–2005 -- _t2. This Strategy Is Not Working: January– June 2006 -- _t3. Together Forward? June–August 2006 -- _t4. Silos And Stovepipes: September– October 2006 -- _t5. Setting The Stage: Early November 2006 -- _t6. A Sweeping Internal Review: Mid–Late November 2006 -- _t7. Choosing To Surge: December 2006 -- _t8. What Kind Of Surge? Late December 2006–January 2007 -- _tPart 2 -- _t9. How The “Surge” Came To Be -- _t10. Iraq, Vietnam, And The Meaning Of Victory -- _t11. Decisions And Politics -- _t12. Blood, Treasure, And Time: Strategy-Making For The Surge -- _t13. Strategy And The Surge -- _t14. Civil-Military Relations And The 2006 Iraq Surge -- _t15. The Bush Administration’S Decision To Surge In Iraq: A Long And Winding Road -- _t16. The President As Policy Entrepreneur: George W. Bush And The 2006 Iraq Strategy Review -- _tAppendix A. Cast Of Characters -- _tAppendix B. Time Line -- _tNotes -- _tAcknowledgments -- _tContributors -- _tIndex
506	0		_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star
520			_aThis is the real story of how George W. Bush came to double-down on Iraq in the highest stakes gamble of his entire presidency. Drawing on extensive interviews with nearly thirty senior officials, including President Bush himself, The Last Card offers an unprecedented look into the process by which Bush overruled much of the military leadership and many of his trusted advisors, and authorized the deployment of roughly 30,000 additional troops to the warzone in a bid to save Iraq from collapse in 2007.The adoption of a new counterinsurgency strategy and surge of new troops into Iraq altered the American posture in the Middle East for a decade to come. In The Last Card we have access to the deliberations among the decision-makers on Bush's national security team as they embarked on that course. In their own words, President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and others, recount the debates and disputes that informed the process as President Bush weighed the historical lessons of Vietnam against the perceived strategic imperatives in the Middle East. For a president who had earlier vowed never to dictate military strategy to generals, the deliberations in the Oval Office and Situation Room in 2006 constituted a trying and fateful moment.Even a president at war is bound by rules of consensus and limited by the risk of constitutional crisis. What is to be achieved in the warzone must also be possible in Washington, D.C. Bush risked losing public esteem and courted political ruin by refusing to disengage from the costly war in Iraq. The Last Card is a portrait of leadership—firm and daring if flawed—in the Bush White House.The personal perspectives from men and women who served at the White House, Foggy Bottom, the Pentagon, and in Baghdad, are complemented by critical assessments written by leading scholars in the field of international security. Taken together, the candid interviews and probing essays are a first draft of the history of the surge and new chapter in the history of the American presidency.
538			_aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Apr 2024)
650		0	_aCounterinsurgency _zIraq _xHistory.
650		0	_aIraq War, 2003-2011 _xCampaigns.
650		0	_aIraq War, 2003-2011 _xDecision making.
650		0	_aMilitary planning _zUnited States.
650		4	_aMilitary History.
650		4	_aPolitical Science & Political History.
650		4	_aU.S. History.
650		7	_aHISTORY / Military / Iraq War (2003-2011). _2bisacsh
653			_aIraq War, War on Terror, Operation Iraqi Freedom, grand strategy, diplomatic history, foreign policy, George W. Bush, Surge, National Security Council, Decision-making, leadership, U.S. Army.
700	1		_aBetts, Richard K. _eautore
700	1		_aBrands, Hal _ecuratore
700	1		_aDueck, Colin _eautore
700	1		_aEngel, Jeffrey A. _ecuratore
700	1		_aFeaver, Peter _eautore
700	1		_aHadley, Stephen _eautore
700	1		_aImmerman, Richard H. _eautore
700	1		_aInboden, William _ecuratore
700	1		_aJervis, Robert _eautore
700	1		_aO’Sullivan, Meghan _eautore
700	1		_aPreston, Andrew _eautore
700	1		_aRovner, Joshua _eautore
700	1		_aSayle, Timothy Andrews _ecuratore
700	1		_aSchake, Kori _eautore
850			_aIT-RoAPU
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781501715204?locatt=mode:legacy
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501715204
856	4	2	_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501715204/original
942			_cEB
999			_c221670 _d221670