000 03924nam a2200529Ia 4500
001 221710
003 IT-RoAPU
005 20250106150838.0
006 m|||||o||d||||||||
007 cr || ||||||||
008 240426t20182010nyu fo d z eng d
020 _a9781501717079
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.7591/9781501717079
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781501717079
035 _a(DE-B1597)503390
035 _a(OCoLC)1038493610
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aUB251.G7W37 1985
072 7 _aPOL036000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a355.3/432/0941
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aWark, Wesley K.
_eautore
245 1 4 _aThe Ultimate Enemy :
_bBritish Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939 /
_cWesley K. Wark.
264 1 _aIthaca, NY :
_bCornell University Press,
_c[2018]
264 4 _c©2010
300 _a1 online resource (304 p.) :
_b5 charts and graphs
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aCornell Studies in Security Affairs
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tPreface --
_tAbbreviations --
_tIntroduction: Naming the Enemy --
_t1. Entering the 1930s—the DRC Report --
_t2. Air Force and Aircraft Industry Intelligence, 1933-1936 --
_t3. The Final Phases in Air Intelligence, 1936-1939 --
_t4. Army and Armaments Industry Intelligence, 1933-1936 --
_t5. The Final Phases in Army Intelligence, 1936-1939 --
_t6. Naval Intelligence, 1933-1939 --
_t7. The IIC and German Economic Preparations for War --
_t8. Four Strategic Appreciations of War against Germany in 1939 --
_tConclusion: The Four Phases of Intelligence --
_tAPPENDIXES --
_tNotes --
_tSelected Bibliography --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aHow realistically did the British government assess the threat from Nazi Germany during the 1930s? How accurate was British intelligence's understanding of Hitler's aims and Germany's military and industrial capabilities? In The Ultimate Enemy, Wesley K. Wark catalogues the many misperceptions about Nazi Germany that were often fostered by British intelligence.This book, the product of exhaustive archival research, first looks at the goals of British intelligence in the 1930s. He explains the various views of German power held by the principal Whitehall authorities—including the various military intelligence directorates and the semi-clandestine Industrial Intelligence Centre—and he describes the efforts of senior officials to fit their perceptions of German power into the framework of British military and diplomatic policy. Identifying the four phases through which the British intelligence effort evolved, he assesses its shortcomings and successes, and he calls into question the underlying premises of British intelligence doctrine.Wark shows that faulty intelligence assessments were crucial in shaping the British policy of appeasement up to the outbreak of World War II. His book offers a new perspective on British policy in the interwar period and also contributes a fascinating case study in the workings of intelligence services during a period of worldwide crisis.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Apr 2024)
650 4 _aHistory.
650 4 _aMilitary History.
650 4 _aWest European History.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Intelligence & Espionage.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.7591/9781501717079
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501717079
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501717079/original
942 _cEB
999 _c221710
_d221710