000 03834nam a22005415i 4500
001 221937
003 IT-RoAPU
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008 220302t20192004nyu fo d z eng d
020 _a9780801442216
_qprint
020 _a9781501720253
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.7591/9781501720253
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781501720253
035 _a(DE-B1597)534012
035 _a(OCoLC)1121053917
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
072 7 _aPOL012000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a327.1/09/04
_222
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aTaliaferro, Jeffrey W.
_eautore
245 1 0 _aBalancing Risks :
_bGreat Power Intervention in the Periphery /
_cJeffrey W. Taliaferro.
264 1 _aIthaca, NY :
_bCornell University Press,
_c[2019]
264 4 _c©2004
300 _a1 online resource (336 p.) :
_b8 tables, 1 line drawing
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aCornell Studies in Security Affairs
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tCONTENTS --
_tTables and Figures --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tAbbreviations --
_tNote on Translations, Romanization, and Stylistic Conventions --
_t1. Power Politics and the Balance of Risk --
_t2. Explaining Great Power Involvement in the Periphery --
_t3. Germany and the 1905 Morocco Crisis --
_t4. Japan and the 1940-41 War Decisions --
_t5. The United States and the Korean War (1950-51) --
_t6. The Limits of Great Power Intervention in the Periphery --
_t7. Implications of the Argument --
_tNotes --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aGreat powers often initiate risky military and diplomatic inventions in far-off, peripheral regions that pose no direct threat to them, risking direct confrontation with rivals in strategically inconsequential places. Why do powerful countries behave in a way that leads to entrapment in prolonged, expensive, and self-defeating conflicts? Jeffrey W. Taliaferro suggests that such interventions are driven by the refusal of senior officials to accept losses in their state's relative power, international status, or prestige. Instead of cutting their losses, leaders often continue to invest blood and money in failed excursions into the periphery. Their policies may seem to be driven by rational concerns about power and security, but Taliaferro deems them to be at odds with the master explanation of political realism. Taliaferro constructs a "balance-of-risk" theory of foreign policy that draws on defensive realism (in international relations) and prospect theory (in psychology). He illustrates the power of this new theory in several case narratives: Germany's initiation and escalation of the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan crises, the United States' involvement in the Korean War in 1950-52, and Japan's entanglement in the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937-40 and its decisions for war with the U.S. in 1940-41.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022)
650 4 _aInternational Studies.
650 4 _aPolitical Science & Political History.
650 4 _aSecurity Studies.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International).
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.7591/9781501720253
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501720253
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501720253/original
942 _cEB
999 _c221937
_d221937