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008 220302t20191994nyu fo d z eng d
020 _a9781501733277
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.7591/9781501733277
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781501733277
035 _a(DE-B1597)534149
035 _a(OCoLC)1129169770
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
072 7 _aPOL012000
_2bisacsh
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aAvant, Deborah D.
_eautore
245 1 0 _aPolitical Institutions and Military Change :
_bLessons from Peripheral Wars /
_cDeborah D. Avant.
264 1 _aIthaca, NY :
_bCornell University Press,
_c[2019]
264 4 _c©1994
300 _a1 online resource (176 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aCornell Studies in Security Affairs
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tAcronyms --
_t1. The Structure of Delegation and Military Doctrine --
_t2. Civil-Military Relations in the United States and Britain --
_t3. Vietnam: Why the Army Failed to Adapt --
_t4. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Marines in Vietnam --
_t5. The Boer War and Malaya: Why the British Army Adapted --
_t6. Conclusion --
_tBibliography --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aEven powerful states face disaster if their armies do not adapt military doctrine to meet new challenges. Comparing the cases of the United States Army in Vietnam and the British Army during the Boer War and the Malayan Emergency, Deborah D. Avant offers a new account of the conditions that help shape doctrine within military organizations.Drawing on the new institutional economics, Avant assumes that actors at every level will seek to enhance their political power. Military organizations will thus respond to civilian goals when military leaders expect rewards for their responsiveness. Tracing the evolution of civil–military relations in the United States and Britain, Avant concludes that a nation's political structure has a major impact on the structure of military organizations and their formation of military doctrine.Avant finds in particular that structural differences between the British and U.S. governments have resulted in very different biases within the two armies. Unified political institutions in Britain worked to create an army that was sensitive to civilian goals. Conversely, the U.S. political system tended to allow adherence to classic principles of military science within the Army and often impeded effective civilian intervention. These contra sting conditions contributed to the relative ease with which the British Army adapted to new peripheral threats and the reluctance with which the U.S. Army responded to change in Vietnam.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022)
650 4 _aInternational Studies.
650 4 _aPolitical Science & Political History.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International).
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.7591/9781501733277
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501733277
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501733277/original
942 _cEB
999 _c222756
_d222756