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008 220302t20202019nyu fo d z eng d
010 _a2019020252
020 _a9781501745188
_qprint
020 _a9781501745171
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9781501745171
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9781501745171
035 _a(DE-B1597)527062
035 _a(OCoLC)1143798441
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 0 0 _aUG1282.A8
072 7 _aPOL012000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a355.8/251190973
_223
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aYoung, Ken
_eautore
245 1 0 _aSuper Bomb :
_bOrganizational Conflict and the Development of the Hydrogen Bomb /
_cWarner R. Schilling, Ken Young.
264 1 _aIthaca, NY :
_bCornell University Press,
_c[2020]
264 4 _c©2019
300 _a1 online resource (240 p.) :
_b1 b&w line drawing
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aCornell Studies in Security Affairs
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tPreface --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tIntroduction --
_t1. The Shock of the "New World" --
_t2. Advising on the Super --
_t3. A Decision Reached --
_t4. Moral and Political Consequences --
_t5. Dissent and Development --
_t6. Tactical Diversions --
_t7. Rewriting Los Alamos --
_tConclusions --
_tNotes --
_tBibliography --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aSuper Bomb unveils the story of the events leading up to President Harry S. Truman's 1950 decision to develop a "super," or hydrogen, bomb. That fateful decision and its immediate consequences are detailed in a diverse and complete account built on newly released archives and previously hidden contemporaneous interviews with more than sixty political, military, and scientific figures who were involved in the decision. Ken Young and Warner R. Schilling present the expectations, hopes, and fears of the key individuals who lobbied for and against developing the H-bomb. They portray the conflicts that arose over the H-bomb as rooted in the distinct interests of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Los Alamos laboratory, the Pentagon and State Department, the Congress, and the White House. But as they clearly show, once Truman made his decision in 1950, resistance to the H-bomb opportunistically shifted to new debates about the development of tactical nuclear weapons, continental air defense, and other aspects of nuclear weapons policy. What Super-Bomb reveals is that in many ways the H-bomb struggle was a proxy battle over the morality and effectiveness of strategic bombardment and the role and doctrine of the US Strategic Air Command.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022)
650 0 _aArms race
_xHistory
_y20th century.
650 0 _aHydrogen bomb
_xGovernment policy
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
650 0 _aHydrogen bomb
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
650 4 _aPolitical Science & Political History.
650 4 _aSecurity Studies.
650 4 _aU.S. History.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International).
_2bisacsh
653 _aH-bomb, oral history, strategic bombardment, morality, decision-making.
700 1 _aSchilling, Warner R.
_eautore
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781501745171?locatt=mode:legacy
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501745171
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501745171/original
942 _cEB
999 _c223301
_d223301