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003			IT-RoAPU
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008			220302t20132013nyu fo d z eng d
020			_a9781609090913 _qprint
020			_a9781501751257 _qPDF
024	7		_a10.7591/9781501751257 _2doi
035			_a(DE-B1597)9781501751257
035			_a(DE-B1597)546141
035			_a(OCoLC)1132406675
040			_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda
050		4	_aJC599.U5
072		7	_aHIS036070 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a341.4/809044 _223
084			_aonline - DeGruyter
100	1		_aBrucken, Rowland _eautore
245	1	2	_aA Most Uncertain Crusade : _bThe United States, the United Nations, and Human Rights, 1941-1953 / _cRowland Brucken.
264		1	_aIthaca, NY : _bCornell University Press, _c[2013]
264		4	_c©2013
300			_a1 online resource (450 p.)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tContents -- _tAcknowledgments -- _tIntroduction: The Origins of a Crusade -- _t1. Defining a Crusade, 1941-1943 -- _t2. Implementing a Vision, 1943-1945 -- _t3. A Conservative Revolution Begins, 1945-1948 -- _t4. Opposition at Home and at the United Nations, 1948-1951 -- _t5. United Nations Success Breeds Failure at Home, 1945-1950 -- _t6. The End of a Crusade, 1951-1953 -- _tConclusion: The Impact of a Crusade, 1953-2011 -- _tNotes -- _tBibliography -- _tIndex
506	0		_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star
520			_aA Most Uncertain Crusade traces and analyzes the emergence of human rights as both an international concern and as a controversial domestic issue for U.S. policy makers during and after World War II. Historian Brucken focuses on officials in the State Department, at the United Nations, and within certain domestic non-governmental organizations, and explains why, after issuing wartime declarations that called for the definition and enforcement of international human rights standards, the U.S. government refused to ratify the first U.N. treaties that fulfilled those twin purposes. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations worked to weaken the scope and enforcement mechanisms of early human rights agreements, and gradually withdrew support for Senate ratification. A small but influential group of isolationist-oriented senators, led by John Bricker (R-OH), warned that the treaties would bring about socialism, destroy white supremacy, and eviscerate the Bill of Rights. At the U.N., a growing bloc of developing nations demanded the inclusion of economic guarantees, support for decolonization, and strong enforcement measures, all of which Washington opposed. Prior to World War II, international law considered the protection of individual rights to fall largely under the jurisdiction of national governments. Alarmed by fascist tyranny and guided by a Wilsonian vision of global cooperation in pursuit of human rights, President Roosevelt issued the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter. Behind the scenes, the State Department planners carefully considered how an international organization could best protect those guarantees. Their work paid off at the 1945 San Francisco Conference, which vested the U.N. with an unprecedented opportunity to define and protect the human rights of individuals. After two years of negotiations, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously approved its first human rights treaty, the Genocide Convention. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), led by Eleanor Roosevelt, drafted the nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Subsequent efforts to craft an enforceable covenant of individual rights, though, bogged down quickly. A deadlock occurred as western nations, communist states, and developing countries disagreed on the inclusion of economic and social guarantees, the right of self-determination, and plans for implementation. Meanwhile, a coalition of groups within the United States doubted the wisdom of American accession to any human rights treaties. Led by the American Bar Association and Senator Bricker, opponents proclaimed that ratification would lead to a U.N. led tyrannical world socialistic government. The backlash caused President Eisenhower to withdraw from the covenant drafting process. Brucken shows how the American human rights policy had come full circle: Eisenhower, like Roosevelt, issued statements that merely celebrated western values of freedom and democracy, criticized human rights records of other countries while at the same time postponed efforts to have the U.N. codify and enforce a list of binding rights due in part to America's own human rights violations.
530			_aIssued also in print.
538			_aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022)
650		0	_aHuman rights _zUnited States _xHistory _y20th century.
650		4	_aHumanities & Human Rights.
650		4	_aInternational Studies.
650		4	_aU.S. History.
650		7	_aHISTORY / United States / 21st Century. _2bisacsh
653			_ahuman rights and US policy, John Bricker, Truman administration, Eisenhower administration, Four Freedoms, Atlantic Charter, Genocide Convention, UN Commission on Human Rights, UNCHR, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
850			_aIT-RoAPU
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.7591/9781501751257
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501751257
856	4	2	_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501751257/original
942			_cEB
999			_c223500 _d223500