000			03419nam a22005295i 4500
001			226058
003			IT-RoAPU
005			20221214234855.0
006			m|||||o||d||||||||
007			cr || ||||||||
008			220629t20222003cou fo d z eng d
020			_a9781626370005 _qPDF
024	7		_a10.1515/9781626370005 _2doi
035			_a(DE-B1597)9781626370005
035			_a(DE-B1597)623182
035			_a(OCoLC)1312726117
040			_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda
050		4	_aE183.8.G3 _b.H55 2003eb
072		7	_aHIS027100 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a327.73043 _221
084			_aonline - DeGruyter
100	1		_aHill, Richard F. _eautore
245	1	0	_aHitler Attacks Pearl Harbor : _bWhy the United States Declared War on Germany / _cRichard F. Hill.
264		1	_aBoulder : _bLynne Rienner Publishers, _c[2022]
264		4	_c©2003
300			_a1 online resource (227 p.)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tContents -- _tAcknowledgments -- _t1 Introduction -- _t2 Beaten to the Punch: Hitler’s Declaration of War -- _t3 Actual Collaboration: German Guilt for Pearl Harbor -- _t4 A Responsible Source: Where Were the German Military Forces? -- _t5 War with the Axis: Europe Through the Backdoor -- _t6 Puppetmaster -- _t7 Hitler’s Fifth Column in Japan -- _t8 Hitler Threatens Japanese Dupes -- _t9 Nobody Knows: Better Safe Than Sorry -- _t10 Conclusion: Why Did the United States Declare War on Germany? -- _tAppendix: Public Opinion Polls -- _tSelected Bibliography -- _tIndex -- _tAbout the Book
506	0		_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star
520			_aIn the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. politicians, policymakers, and citizens focused their desire for retribution not on the obvious target, Japan, but on Hitler's Germany. Richard Hill challenges a major point of conventional wisdom on U.S.-Axis relations to explain why the U.S. held Hitler responsible for the Japanese action—and why Hitler's December 11 declaration of war was inconsequential to the U.S. involvement in the European theater. Hill's carefully argued analysis reveals widespread acceptance in late 1941 that the route to Tokyo was through Berlin—that Germany was the overlord of Japan, as well as its co-conspirator. Despite emerging uncertainty about German guilt for Pearl Harbor, he concludes, the prevailing public opinion in the first weeks after December 7 mandated a Germany-first strategy and continued to color U.S. policy throughout the war.
538			_aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jun 2022)
650		0	_aNational security _xUnited States.
650		0	_aNational security _zUnited States.
650		0	_aNational socialism.
650		0	_aWorld War, 1939-1945 _xDiplomatic history.
650		7	_aHISTORY / Military / World War II. _2bisacsh
850			_aIT-RoAPU
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9781626370005
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781626370005
856	4	2	_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781626370005/original
942			_cEB
999			_c226058 _d226058