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001 233529
003 IT-RoAPU
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006 m|||||o||d||||||||
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008 230228t20082008gw fo d z eng d
019 _a(OCoLC)979689114
019 _a(OCoLC)987934368
019 _a(OCoLC)992545149
020 _a9783110204049
_qprint
020 _a9783110211900
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9783110211900
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9783110211900
035 _a(DE-B1597)35541
035 _a(OCoLC)503443454
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aB995.T34
_bL358 2008eb
072 7 _aPHI016000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a191
_222
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aLaitinen, Arto
_eautore
245 1 0 _aStrong Evaluation without Moral Sources :
_bOn Charles Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics /
_cArto Laitinen.
264 1 _aBerlin ;
_aBoston :
_bDe Gruyter,
_c[2008]
264 4 _c©2008
300 _a1 online resource (385 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 0 _aQuellen und Studien zur Philosophie ,
_x0344-8142 ;
_v86
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tIntroduction --
_t1. What is strong evaluation? A reading and --
_treconstruction of Taylor’s central concept --
_t2. Human agents as strong evaluators --
_t3. Personhood as strongly valued: a strong --
_tevaluator as an end in itself --
_t4. Does identity consist of strong --
_tevaluations? --
_t5. The engaged view and the reality of --
_tvalue --
_t6. Diversity and universality --
_t7. Does moral reality need sources? --
_t8. Evaluative beliefs and knowledge --
_t9. Moral realism and personal variations --
_t10. Conclusion --
_tBackmatter
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aCharles Taylor (1931- ) is one of the leading living philosophers. This is the first extended study on the key notions of his views in philosophical anthropology and ethical theory. Firstly, Laitinen clarifies, qualifies and defends Taylor's thesis that transcendental arguments show that personal understandings concerning ethical and other values (so called "strong evaluation") is necessary, in different ways, for human agency, selfhood, identity and personhood. Secondly, Laitinen defends and develops in various ways Taylor's value realism. Finally, the book criticizes Taylor's view that it is necessary to identify and locate a constitutive source of value, such as God, Nature or Human Reason. Taylor relies heavily on this claim in his accounts of moral life, modern identity and, most recently, secularisation. Laitinen argues that the whole notion of constitutive moral source should be dropped – Taylor's views concerning strong evaluation and value realism are distorted by the question of constitutive "moral sources".
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 28. Feb 2023)
650 0 _aEthics
_xHistory
_y20th century.
650 0 _aPhilosophical anthropology
_xHistory
_y20th century.
650 0 _aValues.
650 4 _aEthik.
650 4 _aPhilosophische Anthropologie.
650 4 _aTaylor, Charles.
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern.
_2bisacsh
653 _aEthics.
653 _aPhilosophical Anthropology.
653 _aTaylor, Charles.
653 _aTheories of Selfhood and Personhood.
653 _aValue theory.
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9783110211900
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9783110211900
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9783110211900/original
942 _cEB
999 _c233529
_d233529