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003			IT-RoAPU
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008			230127t20202020si fo d z eng d
020			_a9789814881807 _qprint
020			_a9789814881814 _qPDF
024	7		_a10.1355/9789814881814 _2doi
035			_a(DE-B1597)9789814881814
035			_a(DE-B1597)567765
035			_a(OCoLC)1164502036
040			_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda
050		4	_aDS779.27 _b.Z56 2020
072		7	_aPOL011000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a327.51 _223
084			_aonline - DeGruyter
100	1		_aPang, Zhongying _eautore
245	1	0	_aFrom Tao Guang Yang Hui to Xin Xing : _bChina's Complex Foreign Policy Transformation and Southeast Asia / _cZhongying Pang.
264		1	_aSingapore : _bISEAS Publishing, _c[2020]
264		4	_c©2020
300			_a1 online resource (36 p.)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tFOREWORD -- _tEXECUTIVE SUMMARY -- _tINTRODUCTION -- _tUNPACKING TAO GUANG YANG HUI -- _tTAO GUANG YANG HUI AND THE NO’s -- _tFROM TAO GUANG YANG HUI TO XIN XING -- _tXIN XING CHARACTERISTICS IN THE “NEW ERA” -- _tCHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA -- _tA 3As FRAMEWORK? -- _tWHITHER CHINA’S COMPLEX FOREIGN POLICY?
506	0		_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star
520			_aThis article traces China’s foreign policy transformation from 2013 to the present. It also examines Deng Xiaoping’s doctrinal response to the political crises of 1989–91 and compares it to current Chinese foreign policy doctrines. From the early 1980s until the 2010s, China’s foreign policy has generally focused on keeping a low profile. Deng’s Tao Guang Yang Hui foreign policy doctrine is characterized by its “No’s”, while Xi Jinping’s Xin Xing is marked by its “New’s”. The move from Tao Guang Yang Hui to Xin Xing is a major doctrinal shift in China’s foreign policy. Since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi’s “new” narratives have seemingly dominated Chinese foreign policy. However, old principles, particularly that of “non-interference” or “no hegemony”, are still alive, albeit in a different form. This transformation is driven by three forces, which this paper describes in the 3As framework: China’s Ambition to be a “great country” and a “non-hegemon” in a changing world; its provision of Alternatives to fill the gaps in regional and global governance structures; and its Adaptation to what it deems as “unprecedented major changes in a century” (Da Bian Ju). As China undergoes this foreign policy transformation, contradictions and dilemmas inevitably emerge. While China’s foreign policy transformation is currently being disrupted by the coronavirus crisis, there have been adjustments which were already apparent before the crisis. The ambitious “One Belt and One Road” strategy, for instance, was replaced by the “Belt and Road Initiative”; “constructive intervention” was replaced by “constructive role”; and “common destiny” was replaced by “shared future”. Looking ahead, China’s foreign policy transformation could include more strategic or, at least, tactical adjustments.
538			_aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 27. Jan 2023)
650		4	_aInternational Relations.
650		7	_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General. _2bisacsh
850			_aIT-RoAPU
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1355/9789814881814
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9789814881814
856	4	2	_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9789814881814/original
942			_cEB
999			_c293937 _d293937