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020 _a9789814951852
_qprint
020 _a9789814951869
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1355/9789814951869
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9789814951869
035 _a(DE-B1597)596886
035 _a(OCoLC)1263021896
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aDS530.65
_b.L66 2021
072 7 _aPOL007000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a959.105
_223
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aLoong, Shona
_eautore
245 1 0 _aCentre-Periphery Relations in Myanmar :
_bLeverage and Solidarity after the 1 February Coup /
_cShona Loong.
264 1 _aSingapore :
_bISEAS Publishing,
_c[2021]
264 4 _c©2021
300 _a1 online resource (40 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tForeword --
_tCentre-Periphery Relations In Myanmar: Leverage And Solidarity After The 1 February Coup --
_tCentre-Periphery Relations In Myanmar: Leverage And Solidarity After The 1 February Coup
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aBuilding interethnic solidarity is crucial for the movement opposing the regime that took power in Myanmar’s 1 February 2021 coup. Analysing the coup as primarily a crisis of democracy underestimates the centrality of ethnic conflict to the Tatmadaw’s role in Myanmar’s national politics. In the context of Myanmar’s ethnic diversity, ethnic armed organizations may play a key role in harmonizing responses to the coup. Successive Myanmar governments have failed to meaningfully address ethnic conflict, thereby entrenching the Tatmadaw’s dominance. Redressing the grievances of non-Bamar groups is crucial to ensuring national and regional stability. Conversely, strategies that mistakenly assume national unity will lead to short-term solutions may cycle back into violence and conflict. There is little evidence that the Tatmadaw is willing to negotiate with ethnic armed organizations or the National Unity Government. These organizations require support in coordinating anti-coup efforts and material resources to enhance their leverage against the post-coup regime. The anti-coup movement’s relationship with Myanmar’s ethnic groups has moved through three broad phases: (1) diversity without coordinated demands; (2) visions of a federal future; and (3) agitating for change. The movement is at a critical juncture. Its success depends on its ability to transform existing centre-periphery relations. The role of ethnic armed organizations and civil society organizations needs to be recognized rather than sidelined in favour of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw or the National Unity Government. Previous missed opportunities for transforming centre-periphery relations are instructive for actors seeking to support the anti-coup movement. Three aspects of the anti-coup movement have historical precedents in Karen State: (1) refuge; (2) non-state social services; and (3) shared experiences of violence. In previous iterations of each, a failure in relational thinking has entrenched the centralization of pow
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 01. Dez 2022)
650 4 _aPolitical Ideology - Democracy.
650 7 _aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Political ideologies / Democracy.
_2bisacsh
700 1 _aLoong, Shona
_eautore
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1355/9789814951869
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9789814951869
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9789814951869/original
942 _cEB
999 _c293970
_d293970