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020 _a9780674036550
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.4159/9780674036550
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780674036550
035 _a(DE-B1597)571832
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aKF5599 ǂb E67 1985eb
072 7 _aLAW000000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a347.303252
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aEpstein, Richard A.
_eautore
245 1 0 _aTakings :
_bPrivate Property and the Power of Eminent Domain /
_cRichard A. Epstein.
264 1 _aCambridge, MA :
_bHarvard University Press,
_c[2009]
264 4 _c©1985
300 _a1 online resource (376 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tPreface --
_tContents --
_tPART I. Philosophical Preliminaries --
_t1. A Tale of Two Pies --
_t2. Hobbesian Man, Lockean World --
_t3. The Integrity of Constitutional Text --
_tPART II. Takings Prima Facie --
_t4. Takings and Torts --
_t5. Partial Takings: The Unity of Ownership --
_t6. Possession and Use --
_t7. Rights of Disposition and Contract --
_t8. Taking from Many: Liability Rules, Regulations, and Taxes --
_tPART III. Justifications for Takings --
_t9. The Police Power: Ends --
_t10. The Police Power: Means --
_t11. Consent and Assumption of Risk --
_tPART IV. Public Use and Just Compensation --
_t12. Public Use --
_t13. Explicit Compensation --
_t14. Implicit In-Kind Compensation --
_t15. Property and the Common Pool --
_t16. Tort --
_t17. Regulation --
_t18. Taxation --
_t19. Transfer Payments and Welfare Rights --
_tCONCLUSION. Philosophical Implications --
_tIndex of Cases --
_tGeneral Index
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aIf legal scholar Richard Epstein is right, then the New Deal is wrong, if not unconstitutional. Epstein reaches this sweeping conclusion after making a detailed analysis of the eminent domain, or takings, clause of the Constitution, which states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. In contrast to the other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, the eminent domain clause has been interpreted narrowly. It has been invoked to force the government to compensate a citizen when his land is taken to build a post office, but not when its value is diminished by a comprehensive zoning ordinance.Epstein argues that this narrow interpretation is inconsistent with the language of the takings clause and the political theory that animates it. He develops a coherent normative theory that permits us to distinguish between permissible takings for public use and impermissible ones. He then examines a wide range of government regulations and taxes under a single comprehensive theory. He asks four questions: What constitutes a taking of private property? When is that taking justified without compensation under the police power? When is a taking for public use? And when is a taking compensated, in cash or in kind?Zoning, rent control, progressive and special taxes, workers’ compensation, and bankruptcy are only a few of the programs analyzed within this framework. Epstein’s theory casts doubt upon the established view today that the redistribution of wealth is a proper function of government. Throughout the book he uses recent developments in law and economics and the theory of collective choice to find in the eminent domain clause a theory of political obligation that he claims is superior to any of its modern rivals.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 06. Mrz 2024)
650 7 _aLAW / General.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/9780674036550?locatt=mode:legacy
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674036550
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780674036550/original
942 _cEB
999 _c303125
_d303125