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001 305151
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006 m|||||o||d||||||||
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008 240826t19951996pau fo d z eng d
020 _a9780271097657
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.1515/9780271097657
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780271097657
035 _a(DE-B1597)691306
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 4 _aD16.9
_b.R57 1996
072 7 _aPHI009000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a901
_220
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aRoberts, Clayton
_eautore
245 1 4 _aThe Logic of Historical Explanation /
_cClayton Roberts.
264 1 _aUniversity Park, PA :
_bPenn State University Press,
_c[1995]
264 4 _c1996
300 _a1 online resource (332 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tPreface --
_t1 THE FAILURE OF MACROCORRELATION --
_t2 THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF COLLIGATION --
_t3 THE NECESSITY OF MICROCORRELATION --
_t4 THE NATURE OF COVERING LAWS --
_t5 THE PROBLEM OF INDISCRIMINATE PLURALISM --
_t6 THE LOGIC OF COLLIGATION --
_t7 STRUCTURE AND THEORY IN HISTORY --
_t8 PURPOSIVE ACTION --
_t9 THE ETIOLOGY OF DESIRE --
_t10 THE ETIOLOGY OF BELIEF --
_t11 THE LOGIC OF HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION --
_t12 CAUSAL EXPLANATION AND THE USES OF HISTORY --
_tGlossary --
_tBibliography --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aEver since 1942, when Carl Hempel declared that historical events are explained by subsuming them under laws governing the occurrence of similar events, philosophers have debated the validity of explanations based on "covering laws." In The Logic of Historical Explanation, Clayton Roberts provides a key to understanding the role of covering laws in historical explanation. He does so by distinguishing between their use at the macro- and micro- levels, a distinction that no other scholar has made. Roberts contends that the positivists were right to believe that covering laws are indispensable in historical explanations but wrong to think that these laws apply to macro-events (such as wars and revolutions). Similarly, the humanists were right to declare that historians do not explain the occurrence of macro-events by subsuming them under covering laws but wrong to deny the role of covering laws in tracing the course of events leading to the macro-event. Roberts resolves this debate by showing that, though useless in explaining macro-events, covering laws are indispensable in connecting the steps in an explanatory narrative. He then sets forth the logic of an explanatory narrative, explores the nature of rational explanation, and distinguishes the logic of historical interpretation from the logic of historical explanation.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Aug 2024)
650 0 _aHistory
_xPhilosophy.
650 0 _aLogic.
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / General.
_2bisacsh
653 _a0-271-01442-3.
653 _a0-271-01443-1.
653 _aCarl Hempel.
653 _aClayton Roberts.
653 _aLogic of Historical Explanation The.
653 _aPhilosophy History.
653 _acovering laws macro-event micro-event historical.
653 _ahumanists positivists.
653 _ainterpretation.
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9780271097657?locatt=mode:legacy
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780271097657
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780271097657/original
942 _cEB
999 _c305151
_d305151